Hegel's theory of moral action, its place in his system and the 'highest' right of the subject

Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy, July, 2007 by David Rose

1 INTRODUCTION

There is at present, amongst Hegel scholars and in the interpretative discussions of Hegel's social and political theories, the flavour of old-style 'apology' for his liberal credentials, as though--prior to any attempt to engage with the social ethics he proposes--there exists a real need to prove Hegel holds basic liberal views palatable to the hegemonic, contemporary political worldview. (1) And this almost ubiquitous defensive attitude is present even in the face of a marked absence of convincing, contemporary avowals of the opposite, as though the default starting position is to assume that Hegel is a conservative or reactionary who distrusts the capacity of the modern subjective conscience to interrogate and legitimate social laws, conventions and institutions (that is, right in its broadest sense). (2) The putative motivation for such an understated presentation of Hegel's endorsement of subjective conscience within the limits and requirements of a rational state is perhaps due to two factors: one, the historical, yet false, understanding of Hegel as a conservative (3); and two, one of the methods for understanding Hegel's ethics is to reconstruct what is left of the modern moral conscience when the philosopher has finished discussing the flaws and contradictions of the Kantian model of moral judgement and motivation. (4) Although this is a fruitful and largely correct approach, it ignores the fact that Hegel's theory of action motivates the critique of transcendentalism rather than merely fills in the hole when one rejects Kantian ethics. (5)

To state clearly and unequivocally what the major claim of this article is, I hold that the critique of 'subjective' moralities in general and the critique of Kantian ethics in particular is neither the sole nor even the main reason for the adoption of an immanent doctrine of ethics. The rejection of Kant is, after all, only the negative part of Hegel's argument which grounds the idea of Sittlichkeit. The positive reason resides in the consequences of Hegel's theory of action and the requirements of the concept of recognition. The transition from the moral point of view to social ethics, that is from Moralitat to Sittlichkeit, in Hegel's system is internally motivated by the position adopted in the discussion of a theory of action in the first part of Moralitat (which, in turn, is a necessary consequence of Hegel's theory of punishment outlined in the latter part of Abstract Right), and not just due to the contradictions that arise from the moral point of view itself. It is commonly held that it is Hegel's continued attack on Kantian morality and, above all, on the empty formalism of the categorical imperative that motivates his postulation of an immanent, as opposed to a transcendental, doctrine of duty. (6) Hegel proposes that motivations for right action cannot originate nor be derived from transcendental reason, so the story goes, and so the only alternative is that determinations of the will are to be found in the agent's institutional roles within the rational state: the subject's duties are found embedded in Sittlichkeit, his ethical substance or moral fabric. (7) And it is the explicitly social origin of moral motivation which has led to the diverse interpretations and judgements on Hegel's account of the role of the subjective conscience within the rational state which, when coupled with the rejection of the liberal Kantian political programme, ground the accusation of political quietism: if a subject finds liberation through the fulfilment of his social role, then any protest grounded in the moral conscience is seemingly ruled out since to protest is to fail to fulfil one's role. So, alternatively, many Hegel scholars feel the need to celebrate the role of the moral conscience and describe it as a necessary attribute of the rational state and, if it is absent, then neither the individual nor the state is fully free. The aim of this paper is see whether the issue concerning the role of the moral conscience in Hegel's social theory can be answered through an exploration of one of the building blocks in his account of the rational state (that is, his much neglected theory of moral action) and to show the role it has to play in establishing subjective claims at the heart of his social ethics. (8) The ambitious agenda of this piece is, on the one hand, to demonstrate that the concept of Sittlichkeit is not only an alternative to transcendental ethics, but is necessarily entailed by the adoption of the modern moral point of view (in much the same way that the realm of 'Abstract Right' requires the realm of morality to make sense of the concepts of crime and coercion, so, too, does 'Morality' require the concept of an immanent doctrine of duty to make sense of free, human action); and, on the other, to show that the challenge that Hegel is, at best, a quietist and, at worst, a reactionary is incompatible with a proper understanding of his political system as a whole and, hence, stress that the moral conscience is a necessary and integral part of the rational state since, otherwise, Hegel's own conditions of free action would not be met.