Hegel's theory of moral action, its place in his system and the 'highest' right of the subject

Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy, July, 2007 by David Rose

So, the second determination, ([beta]), is seemingly consistent with Kant and the evaluation of the agent via their intentions. The idea of intentions and obligations resonates with Kant's good will and the voice of conscience, but Hegel does not want the idea of right to rest on the idea of the otherly out there, that is Kant's transcendental idealism. (20) However, at this stage of the argument, the parallels are striking:

   This subjective or 'moral' freedom is what a European especially
   calls freedom. In virtue of the right thereto a man must possess a
   personal knowledge of the distinction between good and evil in
   general: ethical and religious principles shall not merely lay
   their claim on him as external laws and precepts of authority to be
   obeyed, but have their assent, recognition, or even justification
   in his heart, sentiment, conscience, intelligence, etc. The
   subjectivity of the will in itself is its supreme aim and
   absolutely essential to it (EPM [section] 503).

Here, Hegel is offering his own version of the Kantian characterization of Enlightenment, and one cannot fail to see the parallel with Kant's earlier portrayal of the spirit of his age as the 'age of criticism'. (21) It is significant to note that the claim of the Enlightenment is the identifying mark of moral freedom: it is the coming to age of man. To use a traditional analogy, man has grown into maturity and no longer need rely on the dictates of authority or the motivations of immediate inclination (including social character). The subjective ascription of 'good' or value to an end is necessary to free action for Hegel.

Traditionally these two determinations ([alpha] [beta]) have been held to be necessary and sufficient conditions for free action, yet Hegel adds his third determination ([gamma]): the intention has to be capable of reconstruction by others from the objectivity of the act itself. Hegel feels it is necessary to not only retain the traditional concept of the right of knowledge, but also temper it with an objective constraint. One reason he does so is that, ultimately, Kant's picture fails because it cannot generate purposes a priori or resolve conflicting goods, but Hegel does not introduce his famous Kantian critique here. Instead the reader is offered positive reasons for the adoption of an immanent doctrine of ethics grounded in the Hegelian concept of recognition. It is necessary that others recognize the action as one's own. The action must express the implicit humanity (obligation) rather than appear to be a mere, immediate purpose (wilfulness) and this entails that others must concur with me and my description of the good, otherwise they will continue to treat me under the category of personhood or worse. Intention, therefore, requires recognition by others: 'The implementation of my end therefore has this identity of my will and the will of others within in it--it has a positive reference to the will of others.' (PR [section] 112) The first-person may be the judge of what is good, but his judgement is constrained by the interpretation of the other. The agent has to be aware that his act ought to accord with the expectations of his form of life, otherwise his intention will be either misdescribed or ignored.