Hegel's theory of moral action, its place in his system and the 'highest' right of the subject

Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy, July, 2007 by David Rose

   The right to recognize nothing that I do not perceive as rational
   is the highest right of the subject, but by virtue of its
   subjective determination, it is at the same time formal; on the
   other hand, the right of the rational--as the objective--over the
   subject remains firmly established (PR [section] 132 R).

Subjective social freedom, the moral conscience of the citizen, is necessary for the subject to feel 'at home' within his or her state and is, hence, the 'highest right'. Yet, if it is unable to generate the 'good' from its own reason, it must rely on the objective freedom of Sittlichkeit as those shared meanings and values operative in the practical reasoning of oneself and one's peers coupled with those social practices and material arrangements which make self-determination possible. (26).

3 THE NECESSITY OF THE RIGHT OF OBJECTIVITY FOR RESPONSIBILITY

In his lecture notes, Hegel introduces the right of objectivity and its relation to the rational order prior to the critique of Kant in particular and subjective moralities in general. The latter arguments are supposed to support the already articulated claim that free, moral action is impossible without a medium of immanently shared values and good rather than ground it. One could imagine a hand being raised in the class room and a courageous student asking Hegel whether he had considered the alternative that right action could be known and willed by the subject from reason alone. To which, the professor would reply with the negative reason for the appropriation of an immanent doctrine of duty: the point by point attack on transcendental morality. (27) It would be pertinent just to offer a brief reminder of these points, as Hegel presents them: one, the subjective will cannot overcome conflicts of duty (whether generated by different kinds of duty or self-interest and duty) (EPM [section] 508-9); two, the moral point of view has to be constrained because it is infinitely powerful and can posit (or negate) any good whatsoever as universal good.(EPM [section][section] 510-11; PR [section] 140); and, three, the subject is unable to generate determinations of the will out of his reflective understanding, its abstractness needs to be overcome by objective determinations (EPM [section][section] 506, 508; PR [section] 135).

Hegel is oddly (for once) making an appeal to our intuitive grasp of the phenomenon of moral action. Take the tired and worn out old example of the mother who has to decide whether or not to steal to feed her starving child. The immediate determination of the family, the naturally binding duty of the maternal bond, gives rise to the desire to protect, feed and sustain the child. This is the good-for-mother. Yet, her role in civil society determines that she recognize the rationality of the right to property and this, too, is a good. The universality of good means that these two goods should harmonize, yet the moral conscience is quite able to accept one as right at the expense of the other in one moment, then--in the next second--to reverse such a description. For Hegel, the moral conscience itself cannot decide between conflicting determinations of the will and, if it does so, such a decision is wholly arbitrary and wilful. And if this is the case, then there is no standard by which the agent can be distinguished from the person who acts on a given content of the will (PR [section] 17). Hegel's solution is to make a demand on one's immanent set of duties and values and ask what it is that gives rise to the conflict in the first place. That a child be fed is a good and that the right of property be respected is a good, so such a society in which a conflict between these two is felt, is not rational. The conflict can only be overcome when objective freedom, granted by the institutions of ethical life, eradicates the existence of the mother's need to steal and her subjective freedom can be satisfied. (Through the supply of basic needs as a right (the welfare state) and the eradication of poverty, or legal recognition of her subjective freedom adjudicated in a court.)