Belgium: less than the sum of its parts?

Inroads: A Journal of Opinion, Summer-Fall, 2008 by Johanne Poirier

Polarized and reductive political debates

In Belgium, just about every public policy issue is analyzed through the prism of north-south opposition. In the French-language press and political discourse, the Flemish are often portrayed as right-wing xenophobes who have forgotten that until the 1950s financial transfers flowed from Wallonia to Flanders. In the Flemish debate, French speakers are frequently described as lazy, clinging to an obsolete socialist dream and dependent on financial transfers that now flow from the richer Flanders to Brussels and Wallonia.

This is not to deny that there are significant cultural and political differences among the Flemish, the Walloons and the inhabitants of Brussels (most of whom do not consider themselves to be either one). This is the whole point of institutional solutions to allow distinct policies in different contexts, and the very purpose of a federal system. Nor is this to deny that there are financial transfers, which raise issues of fairness, balance, fiscal responsibility and solidarity (as in any federal or quasi-federal system). It could be argued that, given the demographics of the country, opposition between north and south is largely unavoidable. Contrasts are par for the course in such a divided society, particularly one with a federal architecture. The main problem is that no one at the centre can counter this polarization, or cultivate a balanced view.

A weak federal government

Many divisions in central institutions themselves contribute to polarization. Since the 1970s, central institutions have been divided along linguistic lines. This division is among the compromises negotiated in the transition from a unitary state dominated by a French-speaking minority to one in which the Flemish majority gained significant power. These solutions are typical of consensus democracy in nonfederal countries. Some constitutional reforms, for example, require not only a two-thirds overall majority but also a simple majority in each of the so-called "language groups" in Parliament. The result is that every parliamentarian is "linguistically labelled." Similarly, the constitution requires that the federal government be composed of an equal number of Flemish and French-speaking ministers.

These measures provide strong protection for the French-speaking minority (about 38 per cent of the population). But coupled with a relatively decentralized federal system, these "parity-based arrangements" now also contribute to overall polarization. They crystallise "mono-identities" and encourage radical political rhetoric.

Once a coalition government is actually in place, any significant reform in policy areas that have so far remained federal (such as justice, police, social insurance, large chunks of industrial and employment policy) is almost always out of reach. This fuels centrifugal tendencies by policy reformers, even those whose main concern is (or was) not initially "nationalist" or "autonomist." The previous (Flemish) federal minister of social affairs, adhering to a Blairist Third Way approach, sought more "active" employment policies. This was strongly opposed by French-speaking members of the federal coalition, particularly the Socialists, who view unemployment insurance not as a conditional privilege but as a social right. Unable to achieve reforms at the centre, the Flemish federal minister joined the Flemish government and then pleaded for a "regionalization" of employment policy, so that reforms could at least be introduced in Flanders.