"West Bank First" Strategy Doomed To Fail, Says Brandeis Scholar

Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, The, Jan/Feb 2008 by Awad, Basem

IN A NOV. 15 talk at the Palestine Center in Washington, DC, Dr. Mohammed Samhouri, senior fellow at the Crown Center for Middle East Studies at Brandeis University, painted a bleak outlook for the success of the "West Bank First" (WBF) strategy. That is the name coined for the plan implemented by the Bush administration after Hamas took control of the Gaza Strip in June 2007. According to Samhouri, the underlying assumption of WBF is that "a resumption of foreign aid and the release of Palestinian tax money to the new Palestinian Authority government in the West Bank, on one hand, and a tight economic and political blockade of Hamas-controlled Gaza, on the other hand, [will] enable the former to prosper and cause the latter to stagnate."

Then, the strategy's logic goes, in hopes of sharing the West Bank's fortunes Palestinians in the Gaza Strip will turn against Hamas and toward the new Palestinian Authority government.

Half of the WBF strategy already has been accomplished: the blockade and burgeoning desperation of the Gaza Strip's population. "The question now," Samhouri said, "is how long do the impoverished Palestinians there have to wait before the strategy 'succeeds' in delivering on the other half?" Given the political nature of the WBF strategy, its complex requirements, and the convoluted environment of the West Bank today, "the wait for Gaza and its people indeed could be very, very long," he pointed out.

Samhouri laid out five conditions that need to be met for the "West Bank First" strategy to have a chance of success: (1) a favorable political environment; (2) the substantial dismantling of Israeli restrictions on Palestinian movement; (3) the effective use of foreign aid to rebuild the Palestinian economy's productive capacity; (4) a resurgence of confidence on the part of the domestic private sector; and (5) the non-renewal of violence-both intra-Palestinian violence and Palestinian-Israeli.

There is little reason to be optimistic that any of these conditions will be met, Samhouri argued. In fact, he stated, "It is extremely unlikely the WBF strategy will deliver anything but the exact opposite of what it proclaims to be.

"The fundamental problem," he explained, "is that [the strategy] is politically motivated and hardheadedly focused on the single goal of isolating and defeating Hamas. By so doing, the strategy has so far recklessly destroyed the economy of the Gaza Strip and needlessly brought mounting misery to its already stressed population-without assurances of any kind of its success in the West Bank or any thoughtful consideration of the grave consequences of its likely failure."

Samhouri recommended a serious reconsideration of this strategy and a change of course, to one that will truly "help foster Palestinian reconciliation, bring Gaza back into the Palestinian main political and economic fabric, and stabilize the fragile conditions on the ground.

"Such an alternative approach," he continued, "if driven and sustained by a shared strategic vision by all sides, should provide a more auspicious environment for both negotiating a lasting political settlement and, at the same time, dealing effectively with the adverse economic consequences of four decades of Israeli military occupation of the Palestinian land. Anything else will not work and will only be tantamount to building on shaky ground-a total waste of time and resources, with an almost assured and certain outcome."

-Basem Awad