Substantial convergence or parallel paths? Similarities and differences in the economic analysis of horizontal mergers in U.S. and EU competition law.

Antitrust Bulletin,  March, 2004  by Lorenzo Coppi

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Before the GE/Honeywell (1) case, the consensus was that transatlantic merger control displayed remarkable substantive convergence, despite substantial procedural differences. (2) In the aftermath of GE/Honeywell, commentators have emphasized the many significant differences in the way U.S. and European Community (EC) competition authorities assess mergers.

(3) The recent debate on the reform of European Union (EU) merger control has further highlighted apparent differences between the analyses carried out in the two jurisdictions. Where is the truth? Is the way EC and U.S. merger control works inherently different? This article attempts an answer to these questions by looking beyond the formal ...