Groups versus individuals in Hume's political economy

Monist, The, April, 2007 by Margaret Schabas

Neoclassical economics is not only considerably more ahistorical, but also reductionist. Reductionism is also a central component of most versions of methodological individualism, namely that whatever "social facts" one might address can be successfully reduced to individual actions and attributes without remainder (Brodbeck 1968). Hume has been described as a "reductive empiricist" (Garrett 1997, 36). But for him there would be no reason to stop at the individual, given his analysis of the problem of personal identity. Insofar as we cannot individuate bundles of perceptions, our identities are highly fluid. One cannot perceive a mind qua container, but only the contents. For Hume, the container dissolves under reflection. In short, Hume's sensory atomism takes him past the way-station of the individual right down to simple impressions. Alternatively, one can ascend up to larger groups very readily, as Hume does in his celebrated essay "Of National Characters" (Hume 1985, 197-215; see also Ainslie 1995). Perhaps the only fair conclusion to draw is that it would prove very difficult to link Hume's take on personal identity with his social ontology.

When it comes to his moral theory, Hume is quite explicit that reason can never be a motivation. Only passions produce or prevent actions, and moral distinctions are not themselves the "offspring of reason" (Hume 2000a, 295). Hume tantalizes us with the even bolder claim that "morality is not an object of reason" (Hume 2000, 201). What he means by this is that one does not observe vice or virtue in an action, like murder. What one observes are passions, motives, etc. To denounce a specific action as vicious requires a subjective judgment that is "the object of feeling, not of reason" (301).

Hume by no means ignores intentionality in his efforts to generate a moral theory. If anything, moral judgment focuses entirely on intentions, not actions. But intentions are only culpable insofar as they stem from stable and robust character traits. A sudden and temporary burst of insanity that resulted in murder might not yield incarceration under Hume's system. As for the stable character traits, they are not something we normally acquire through our volition or free will. "A soldier and a priest are different characters, in all nations, and all ages; and this difference is founded on circumstances, whose operation is eternal and unalterable" (Hume 1985, 199). Hume puts all the emphasis on the social conditions that mold our character, whether nationality, profession, or class. It is this stability that motivates his conviction that there are laws in the moral sciences, that we no more expect our dinner guest to stab us and steal our silver than for the house to topple in an earthquake. In sum, for Hume "the fabric and constitution of our mind no more depends on our choice, than that of our body" (Hume 1985, 168). True, we can make some meaningful choices, such as to pursue a life of learning rather than one of wealth. So perhaps the significant crossroads in our life are genuine. But when it comes to tastes, things are slow to change. "Nature is more uniform in the sentiments of the mind than in most feelings of the body, and produces a nearer resemblance in the inward than in the outward part of human kind. There is something approaching to principles in mental taste; and critics can reason and dispute more plausibly than cooks or perfumers." For Hume, the only way to bring about change, say in a taste in music (having experienced both kinds), is to change the very fabric of the mind. Argument is virtually impotent.