The rise and fall of James Beattie's common-sense theory of truth

Monist, The, April, 2007 by James Fieser

Introduction

Imagine a world in which the most extreme views of philosophical skeptics were put into practice. A hallmark of skepticism, for example, is to doubt everything; acting out on this, someone might bandage over his eyes, ears, and other sensory inlets, striving to become catatonic. Another theme of skepticism is to dispute endlessly; thus, two people might sit hundreds of feet apart and quarrel in such a soft whisper that they could not possibly hear each other. Skepticism also attempts to undermine all reasoning; to this end, someone might attempt an experiment in which a human-looking puppet inserts its feet into its mouth, swallows itself entirely, and disappears. Skeptics believe that our most fundamental beliefs and behaviors result from social convention; to demonstrate this, a scientist might try to raise a human child to behave like a sheep, or deprogram a chicken from its usual custom of laying eggs. This is the nightmarish world that James Beattie describes in his fictional essay "The Castle of Scepticism." (1) As bizarre and counter-intuitive as skepticism is, he believes that ordinary people are nevertheless psychologically drawn to it, usually out of pretentiousness, ignorance, conceit, fashion, moral depravity, ambition, or just plain speculative curiosity. Because so many common people latch onto the views of skeptics, he argues, it is not merely a game for philosophers. Instead, it can affect the behavior of the masses with dangerous consequences--stripping people of their confidence in science, morality, and religion. As Beattie depicts it in "The Castle of Scepticism," the friendly skeptic, David Hume, welcomes people to his side, and, when within arm's reach, grabs them and throws them into a bottomless pit.

Beattie's 1770 Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth was a valiant attempt to expose scepticism's absurdities and dangers. Inspired by Thomas Reid, he felt that God implanted several common-sense intuitions within human nature, particularly beliefs about the integrity of reason, sense perceptions, and moral virtue. As Beattie reflected on skeptics' efforts to undermine truth, it occurred to him that common sense not only guides us towards truth, but it defines and is the criterion of truth. In his words, "that to us is truth which we feel that we must believe; and that to us is falsehood which we feel that we must disbelieve." This goes beyond what any other philosopher in his day or since has said about the function of common sense. In more contemporary terminology, he is offering a theory of truth that radically differs from the more familiar correspondence theory. As bold and innovative as his common-sense theory was, within a few years he revised his Essays, removing the central components of his common-sense definition of truth. Why did he do this? He was apparently swayed by harsh criticisms of his theory, particularly by Joseph Priestley. I will discuss Beattie's claim and the attacks on it, and will suggest ways in which a common-sense standard of truth might be viable.

Definitions of Truth in the Essay

Beattie began working on his Essay in the mid-1760s, and by 1766 had finished much of his first draft. In a letter at this time to his friend, William Forbes, he describes the essence of his theory, clearly articulating his common-sense criterion of truth:

   My doctrine is this: that as we know nothing of the eternal
   relations of things, that to us is and must be truth, which we feel
   that we must believe; and that to us is falsehood, which we feel
   that we must disbelieve. I have shown that all genuine reasoning
   does ultimately terminate in certain principles, which it is
   impossible to disbelieve, and as impossible to prove: that
   therefore the ultimate standard of truth to us is common sense, or
   that instinctive conviction into which all true reasoning does
   resolve itself: that therefore what contradicts common sense is in
   itself absurd, however subtle the arguments which support it: for
   such is the ambiguity and insufficiency of language, that it is
   easy to argue on either side of any question with acuteness
   sufficient to confound one who is not expert in the art of
   reasoning. [Beattie to William Forbes, January 30, 1766] (2)

There are two central points to this passage. First, he denies that we know the "eternal relations of things" in themselves. The notion of "eternal relations" appears prominently in the writings of rationalist British philosophers such as Samuel Clarke and William Wollaston, who believed that eternal relations were Platonic form-like features of the universe. Beattie, though, appears to use the expression more broadly in reference to the nature of things--elements of reality and the laws that govern things. His point is that we cannot judge truth and falsehood by inspecting reality itself since that is beyond what we can know. Second, he makes clear that common sense is the "standard" of truth, and not simply a guide for recognizing the truth of at least some contentions. For example, my common sense inclines me to believe that the tree in front of me physically exists, and so it is plausible for me to judge that this belief is true. However, Beattie goes a step further and suggests that 'X is true' means that X is grounded in an instinctive common-sense conviction. It is in this sense that he is offering a definition of truth to be placed for consideration alongside other theories, most notably the correspondence theory.