A program for "naturalizing" metaphysics, with application to the ontology of events

Monist, The, July, 2007 by Alvin I. Goldman

1. Metaphysics and Cognitive Science

I wish to advance a certain program for doing metaphysics, a program in which cognitive science would play an important role. (1) This proposed ingredient is absent from most contemporary metaphysics. There are one or two local parts of metaphysics where a role for cognitive science is commonly accepted, but I advocate a wider range of application. I begin by laying out the general program and its rationale, with selected illustrations. Then I explore in some detail a single application: the ontology of events. I do not push hard for any particular ontological conclusion, about either events or any other topic. The focus is methodology, not a particular output of the methodology.

Here is a recently published characterization of the metaphysical enterprise, one that probably captures orthodox practice pretty well and to which I take no exception.

   Metaphysical investigations begin with initial appearances.... In
   everyday life, these appearances are seldom questioned. In
   metaphysics, we investigate further. As we pursue a metaphysical
   topic, we seek to get beyond appearances. We consider arguments
   about how things really are. We seek to learn the reality of the
   situation. Reality may confirm initial appearances or it may
   undercut them. Either way, our goal is to find the ultimate
   reality. This suggests that the subject matter distinctive of
   metaphysics is ultimate reality. (Conee and Sider 2005: 200)

The author of this passage, Earl Conee, (2) does not endorse the stated view unqualifiedly. He cavils at the claim that metaphysics is concerned with 'ultimate' reality, suggesting that 'ultimate' adds nothing of importance. He also worries that if metaphysics is simply concerned with reality, it doesn't differ from other factual investigations. Leaving these quibbles aside, Conee seems to find this characterization of metaphysics fairly satisfactory, as would other metaphysicians, I suspect.

Although Conee doesn't explicitly say this, 'reality' is normally understood to refer to what exists (in the broadest sense) in a mind-independent way. Metaphysics seeks to understand the nature of the world as it is independently of how we think of it. The suggestion that we should study the mind to understand reality would therefore strike many metaphysicians as wrong-headed. They would readily concede that a portion of metaphysics--the metaphysics of mind--has mind and mental states as its proper province. But the mind is just a fragment of reality. Most sectors of metaphysics are concerned with extra-mental reality. It would be grossly misdirected for those other sectors of metaphysics to aim their inquiries at the mind. Nonetheless, this is what I propose. I don't mean that a study of the mind is the final aim of all metaphysical inquiries; but it should be studied in the course of other metaphysical investigations. It should be a contributing part of metaphysical investigation, even those investigations for which the mind is not the primary target.

To clarify the proposal, it must be explained that the referent of 'the mind' is (or includes) the aggregate of organs or mechanisms of cognition. Cognitive organs or mechanisms play a critical role in the causal production of appearances, including metaphysical appearances (whatever exactly we take that to connote). In considering whether such metaphysical appearances should be accepted at face value or, alternatively, should be superseded through some sort of metaphysical reflection, it obviously makes sense to be as informed as possible about how these mechanisms of cognition work. That is why cognitive science is relevant.

Let me expand on this proposal. As Conee indicates, metaphysical inquiries usually start with default metaphysical assumptions, i.e., naive, intuitive, or unreflective judgments. These correspond to what he calls "appearances." We intuitively judge that objects are colored, that people have free will, that some events cause others, that time passes (always flowing in the same direction), and that some possibilities are unactualized. Metaphysical inquiry starts from such default judgments, but it is prepared to analyze or interpret them in alternative ways, or even to abandon them altogether. They are all up for critical scrutiny, of one sort or another. How should we proceed in this critical, reflective activity? To what degree should precedence, or priority, be given to our naive metaphysical convictions?

Virtually all metaphysicians agree that our default metaphysical views are subject to philosophical refinement. If there are inconsistencies among our naive metaphysical views, some must be abandoned. In addition, most contemporary metaphysicians would agree that science should sometimes override our naive metaphysics. Physics might give us reason to conclude that time doesn't "pass" at all; that it has no asymmetrical directedness; or, indeed, that there is no such thing as time, only space-time. Again, physics might give us reason to abandon certain assumptions about causal relations. Most existing appeals to science in defense of metaphysical refinements (or revolutions) are appeals to physical science. This is understandable, given that most of metaphysics is concerned with ostensibly non-mental targets (e.g., color, causation, time, possibilia). I argue, however, that even in these sectors of metaphysics, evidence from mental science, that is, cognitive science, can and should be part of metaphysical inquiry.