Sending out an S.O.S.: public safety communications interoperability as a collective action problem

Federal Communications Law Journal, June, 2007 by Jerry Brito

Examples of both approaches can be found in environmental regulation. (88) To abate pollution, government can take a command-and-control approach and issue regulatory mandates backed by the threat of fines or loss of permits. On the other hand, a market incentives approach could be employed. Tradable emission rights could be assigned in order to give polluters a financial incentive to invest in cleaner processes. In effect, market incentives are leveraged to induce members of a group to act in a group-oriented way.

In the case of interoperability, a command-and-control approach would likely mean a top-down mandate requiring public safety agencies to adopt a certain interoperable communications system. Perhaps the central government would build out one shared network and require all agencies to adopt it. While this would address the collective action problem, it would preclude the benefits of competition among rival networks. Additionally, if one standard or one firm is to be chosen by government, rent-seeking behavior will also likely arise.

Rather than a top-down approach, economic incentives can be employed to provide a positive selective incentive to public safety agencies in an effort to overcome the collective action problem. Such a policy change can also result in efficient use of resources, including spectrum.

A. Spectrum Integration

Earlier it was noted that a law firm wishing to equip its lawyers with mobile communications does not build out its own system, but rather simply buys capacity from a commercial network carrier. But why is this the case? In theory, a law firm could purchase spectrum, design a proprietary communications platform, and build towers to support it. It is a ridiculous proposition because the cost of self-providing would be outrageous relative to the alternative: sharing a network with every other consumer. A law firm or any other business or individual consumer, for that matter--has a financial incentive to find the most cost effective solution.

As we have seen, however, public safety agencies do not consider the true costs of their communications systems because they do not face the opportunity cost of the spectrum they are given by the FCC. Unlike cars and guns--which they would never consider building themselves because they are not subsidized with glass, steel, or rubber--first responders do not give a second thought to building their own communications network.

We should therefore rethink the national policy that balkanizes public safety communications by subsidizing each agency with a spectrum license. Instead of spectrum, first responders should be given budgets with which they can purchase communications capacity from commercial providers the same way they purchase everything else they need to fulfill their missions. (89) They should also be allowed to trade their spectrum. Such a system would let public safety agencies face the true cost of their communications choices and, like the law firm in our example, they will quickly find that sharing a network is a more cost effective solution.