Between morality and diplomacy: the Vatican's "silence" during the holocaust

Journal of Church and State, Summer, 2008 by Frank J. Coppa

As Pacelli feared, relations between the Vatican and Berlin steadily deteriorated in 1938, as Pius condemned the racism of the Reich. (70) In April 1938, relations became even worse when the Sacred Congregation of Seminaries, presided over by the pope, condemned Nazi Germany's racism as pernicious. (71) In July, Pius XI further aroused Berlin when he announced the absolute incompatibility between Nazi nationalism and Catholicism. (72) Scandalized by the policies of the Reich, Pius deplored the extension of Nazi anti-Semitism to Catholic Austria following the Anschluss of 1938, and bluntly said so. (73) Not surprisingly, he repudiated the Austrian Cardinal Theodor Innitzer who applauded the absorption of Austria by Germany, summoned him to Rome, and constrained the cardinal to issue a retraction. (74)

Meanwhile, the specter of racism loomed closer to home as Pius learned of Fascist Italy's determination to emulate Nazi anti-Semitism. Pius XI expressed his displeasure during the course of the Fuhrer's visit to Rome in May 1938 by leaving for Castel Gandolfo, closing the Vatican Museum, which Hitler had hoped to visit, and not inviting German officials into Vatican City. From Castel Gandolfo, he lamented the exposition of a cross not of Christ in Rome, (75) and decided to issue an encyclical condemning racism, knowing this would alarm his secretary of state, part of the curia, and many of the German bishops. The task was delicate and difficult, for the secretariat of state still clung to Gasparri's program favoring conciliation rather than confrontation. Unquestionably, publication of an encyclical critical of Nazi and Fascist racist policies would have stirred up the Axis dictators and likely torpedoed the concordats of 1929 and 1933, as Gasparri had warned and Pacelli feared.

The pope, who felt obligated as Vicar of Christ to issue a strong and public condemnation of racism, suspected that Pacelli and his allies in the curia would attempt to undermine the endeavor and questioned Pacelli's willingness to balance ethical concerns with practical considerations. While he was nuncio in Germany, before the accession of Hitler, Pacelli concurred with Pius XI that Joseph Mayer's volume on The Le al Sterilization of the Mentally III (1928), contained a number of "erroneous theses" that violated Catholic doctrine. However, citing political considerations, he cautioned the Holy See against the condemnation of a lecturer at a state university. This did not prevent Pius XI from issuing the encyclical Casti connubii (1930), which condemned and rejected sterilization. (76)

Later, as secretary of state, Pacelli made frequent and fervent efforts to prevent a diplomatic rupture with the fascist regimes as Gasparri had counseled, calling for a more diplomatic, less confrontational approach toward the dictators. The o e understandably concluded he could not rely on his secretary of state to draft an encyclical that endangered reconciliation. This led the pope to bypass the secretariat of state and seek an outsider to draft ft the document. He selected the American Jesuit John La Farge whose position to racism he shared, as well as his conclusion that the church could not remain silent in its presence. We now know that on 22 June 1938, the secretary of state left the papal chamber as Father La Farge arrived, and was not included in the pope's discussion with this Jesuit when the "encyclical," against racism and anti-Semitism was commissioned. (77) Pacelli was not briefed on the scope of the meeting then or later. (78) In fact, soon after becoming pope he confessed he knew nothing about the projected encyclical prior to the death of Pius XI. (79)