Don't count on it: why we need paper trails to back up compromised and fallible voting machines--and why we're not getting them.
American Prospect, The, January, 2005 by Goldberg, Mark Leon
FOR ELECTION OFFICIALS IN FORT LAUDERDALE, Florida, November 2 had passed with merciful ease. The balloting was deemed an administrative success--until two days later, that is, when election workers noticed a mathematical oddity: As they canvassed more votes, the tallies in certain races had decreased. After some hand-wringing, election officials discovered that the Election Systems & Software (ES&S) machines used by Broward County to count absentee ballots were inexplicably programmed to subtract votes once the 16-bit devices hit a ceiling of 32,767 votes.
According ...
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