Heidegger and the Ground of Ethics: A Study of Mitsein

Review of Metaphysics, The, Sept, 1999 by Richard Capobianco

OLAFSON, Frederick A. Heidegger and the Ground of Ethics: A Study of Mitsein. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. 108 pp. Cloth, $49.95; paper, $14.95--Frederick Olafson makes the case sensibly and eloquently that, despite Heidegger's failed personal and political judgments, "the profoundly original constellation of ideas he introduced in Being and Time can make an important contribution to our understanding of the whole ethical side of our lives" (p. 6). In particular, Olafson argues that Heidegger's phenomenological analysis of Mitsein provides the framework for thinking about the "ground" of ontic ethical theory, rules, and prescriptions.

Over the years, several scholars reflecting on Being and Time have noted that Heidegger's discussion of Dasein's being-in-the-world as being-with other Daseins (Mitsein or Mitdasein) would be an important starting point for a consideration of an "ethical" perspective drawn along distinctively Heideggerian lines. Yet, for the most part, this suggestion has not been carefully considered or worked out. Olafson recognizes the importance of the notion of Mitsein and works out the implications in an original way. He also attempts to "amplify" Heidegger's perspective "quite significantly," confessing that he must move beyond Heidegger to do so and employ a variety of other philosophical ideas (p. 6).

In section 26 of Being and Time Heidegger states: "By reason of this with-like being-in-the-world, the world is always the one that I share with others. The world of Dasein is a with-world [Mitwelt]. Being-in is being-with [Mitsein] others. Their being-in-themselves within-the-world is Dasein-with [Mitdasein]" (Macquarrie and Robinson, New York: Harper and Row, 1962. p. 155, slightly modified). Developing this insight, Olafson observes, following Heidegger, that our being-with-others is always also a being-in-the-truth-with-others. That is, Daseins together disclose the world, and this is what Olafson refers to as "truth as partnership" (chap. 1). Further, our shared disclosure of the world includes the decisive disclosure of other Daseins as beings like ourselves who are the very loci of disclosure. Thus, our being-in-the-truth-with-others discloses the uniqueness of other Daseins among the beings which we encounter.

Olafson argues that precisely this consideration is needed to ground the implicit ethical judgment at the heart of Heidegger's discussion of authentic "caring-about" (Fursorge) in Being and Time. Heidegger's position that Dasein authentically "cares-about" the other by respecting the uniqueness of the other's existence Coy clearing the way and not getting in the way) is unfounded unless we link it to the more fundamental analysis of Dasein's disclosure of the other as a being, like itself, which, uniquely among beings, has its Being as an issue for itself. In other words, respect for the Dasein of the other flows from Dasein's being-in-the-truth-with-others. This respectful "caring-about" the other also informs collective or cooperative enterprises which, Heidegger maintains, are authentic only in so far as such togetherness "frees the other in his freedom for himself" (Being and Time, p. 159).

In all, Olafson skillfully weaves together several threads of Heidegger's thinking, and he makes a strong case that the notion of Mitsein is in fact the most adequate philosophical starting point for a fully developed ethical account. His effort in the latter part of the book to build just such a more complete ethical perspective on the "ground" of Heidegger's fundamental ontology is thoughtful and interesting, if less compelling because so syncretistic. Still, Olafson's philosophical project is an important one which deserves the attention and efforts of others.

--Richard Capobianco, Stonehill College.