Sorabji, Richard. Self: Ancient and Modern Insights about Individuality, Life, and Death

Review of Metaphysics, The, Dec, 2008 by Marya Schechtman

SORABJI, Richard. Self: Ancient and Modern Insights about Individuality, Life, and Death. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, co-published with Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. xi 400 pp. Cloth, $35.00--Richard Sorabji's Self: Ancient and Modern Insights about Individuality, Life, and Death begins and ends with mortality. In the introduction Sorabji tells us that his interest in the topic of the self "stemmed from my discovery at the age of six that mortality applied to me and not just to insects" (p. 1). The final chapter addresses the question of whether the fact of mortality should fill us with dismay, and concludes that while evolution may have programmed us to feel horror at the thought of annihilation, the "ideal attitude is to think that what matters is not the location of our life in the flowing series of past, present, and future, but the quality of our life" (p. 341). Between these very personal observations is a treasure trove of reflection on a range of questions concerning the nature and duration of self.

These reflections proceed via a combination of meticulous scholarship, rigorous philosophical analysis, and astute observation. They feature rich, detailed readings of texts often neglected in present-day discussion, concentrating primarily on the Ancients, but including also writings from Buddhist, Hindu and Islamic thinkers. Throughout, Sorabji gives the reader access to subtle and ingenious insights largely lost in current debates. He demonstrates the ways in which these insights can be applied to existing problems, and offers his own account of the self as "an embodied individual whose existence is plain to see ... something that has or owns psychological states as well as having or owning a body and bodily states" (p. 4).

Virtually every aspect of selfhood is addressed in the book, which is divided into seven main topics. Part I sets the stage by discussing the question of what a self is, and explaining why, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, we should operate on the assumption that selves exist. Here Sorabji argues that there is a discernable philosophy of the self in antiquity, surveying the way in which different accounts of and puzzles about the self arise at different times. Part II deals with questions of personal identity over time, showing how many of the puzzles about diachronic identity found in Locke and the Moderns, and in present-day literature, echo issues that were discussed (often in richer detail) by the Ancients. Part III looks at how questions about the differentiation of selves have been addressed throughout history, highlighting the tension between the demand for a unified and transcendent soul on the one hand, and the desire for individual immortality on the other. The problem of individuating embodied selves is also discussed.

Part IV shifts gears and considers various topics related to the role of the self in practical reasoning. Here Sorabji contrasts the Stoic view that what is right for someone to do depends upon her nature with Kantian universalism, discusses narrative conceptions of the self and the emphasis they place on life as a whole, and looks at early understandings of self as will. Part V looks at the many puzzles that arise with respect to the notion of self-awareness. Sorabji considers differing views on how difficult it is to achieve self-knowledge (contrasting, for example, the Platonists with Augustine and Descartes on this matter) and discusses the idea (found both in Aristotle and in current developmental psychology) that awareness of self requires having a conception of others. He also describes Ancient views on the unity of self-consciousness, relating them to ongoing debates in the philosophy of psychology. Part VI supplies the most direct and sustained argument for Sorabji's repeated claim that we are not ownerless bundles of experiences but rather the owners of such bundles. This discussion includes extended focus on Buddhist and Hindu accounts of serf. Part VII addresses the question of whether there is a coherent way of thinking about surviving the death and destruction of our bodies. Reincarnation and disembodied existence are considered, and there is a fascinating consideration of the possibility that we might survive through time's being circular. Finally, Sorabji returns to the question that originally got him thinking about the self; whether it is rational to feel horror at the possibility of one's own annihilation.

Each of these seven sections is overflowing with detailed exegesis of entrancing yet difficult passages from texts both familiar and obscure. Especially effective is Sorabji's strategy of offering insightful and incisive philosophical analysis first and ending with extended quotations of the relevant passages. Personal and broadly humanistic concerns--like the question of mortality that frames the book--are never far from the discussion, no matter how esoteric or abstract the topic at hand. In this way Soabji brings to life and makes compelling complex philosophical debates that have been pursued for millennia. There is truly something for everyone in this magnificent study, and it represents a precious resource for those interested not only in questions of self, but more generally in the evolution of human thought.--Marya Schechtman, University of Illinois at Chicago.