Malebranche's Theory of the Soul: A Cartesian Interpretation

Review of Metaphysics, The, June, 1999 by Robert Sleigh

SCHMALTZ, Tad M. Malebranche's Theory of the Soul: A Cartesian Interpretation. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996. viii 308 pp. Cloth, $55.00--Anglo-American scholarship concerning Malebranche is thin compared with the French scholarship of Gouhier, Gueroult, Alquie, Dreyfus, Robinet, and Rodis-Lewis. Yet genuinely significant studies in English have appeared recently, namely, Steven Nadler's Malebranche and Ideas (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992) and Nicholos Jolley's The Light of the Soul (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990). Add to this list the book herein under review--Tad M. Schmaltz's Malebranche's Theory of the Soul.

There are two theses concerning the soul that Malebranche formulated and defended, each of which is a clear departure from Descartes, and each of which was seen as problematic by many of Malebranche's contemporaries. The first is the more famous--the thesis that objects of our perceptions are ideas in the mind of God. This is the notorious doctrine of "The Vision of All Things in God." The second, less well known, is the thesis that although we have a more immediate and secure knowledge of the existence of our soul than of the existence of our body (or any body), nonetheless, we do not know the nature of our soul by means of a clear idea, as we do know the nature of body, and therefore, our knowledge of the nature of the soul is inferior to our knowledge of the nature of body.

In the secondary literature concerning Malebranche, concentration on the second thesis is the road less traveled; it is Schmaltz's route. Schmaltz's investigation, and the book itself, have two parts. In the first part his principal alms are these: To formulate the thesis perspicuously, and to explain why Malebranche thought it both true and a correction of Descartes, that is, the view Descartes's own basic principles imply, although Descartes failed to see that. Antoine Arnauld offered a variety of criticisms of Malebranche's thesis. He formulated a central one as follows: " ... if we did not have a clear and distinct vision of the soul, we could not demonstrate its immortality, nor its spirituality, nor its freedom" (Des Vraies et des Fausses Idles, chap. 24). The second part of Schmaltz's work is a detailed investigation of Malebranche's efforts to establish that Arnauld's conditional is false; that is, that we can demonstrate the soul's immortality, spirituality, and freedom even though we lack a clear and distinct idea of the soul; that is, even though we do not possess knowledge of the nature of the soul that is as perfect as our knowledge of the nature of body.

My description of the first part of Schmaltz's project might suggest to some that the work has a somewhat narrow focus. I hope that my description of the second part of Schmaltz's project makes clear that his work covers many of the major themes of Malebranche's philosophy. In fact, there are few central themes in Malebranche's philosophy to the understanding of which Schmaltz does not offer a contribution. The contributions are impressive. Schmaltz brings to bear on the topics under scrutiny a detailed knowledge of the relevant secondary literature, especially the vast French secondary literature. Yet more impressive is Schmaltz's use of his considerable knowledge of those whose work was relevant to Malebranche--Descartes, of course, but also La Forge, Cordemoy, Desgabets, Regis, and the ubiquitous Antoine Arnauld.

Schmaltz brings keen analytic insight to his project, as well as the skills of historical scholarship. Chapters 4, 5, and 6, devoted respectively to Malebranche's alleged demonstrations of the soul's spirituality, immortality, and freedom are replete with acute philosophical argumentation and insight. The chapter on Malebranche on freedom--a genuinely daunting topic given Malebranche's commitment to the claim that God is the only real cause, but not the cause of sin--is as subtle as any discussion of that topic in my ken.

As is to be expected, there are aspects of Schmaltz's account where I have reservations--where I am not completely convinced. Schmaltz makes an effort to explain Malebranche's distinctions between imperfect knowledge through consciousness and more perfect knowledge through a clear idea in terms of Nagel's distinction between subjective and objective views of the world. I find the comparison less helpful than Schmaltz does. Schmaltz finds numerous of Arnauld's objections to Malebranche more superficial than I do. As noted Schmaltz's discussion of Malebranche on freedom is subtle; I am inclined to think that perhaps the account attributed to Malebranche is more subtle than any he actually held. Minor matters; this is an admirable book.