Clinging to democracy: assessing the Russian legislative-executive relationship under Boris Yeltsin's Constitution

Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, May, 2000 by Ian Richard Brown

An examination of the two stages of the 1998 conflict shows that constitutional imbalances of power on paper may be mitigated or exacerbated by personalities and external events.(139) That is, the Russian Constitution of 1993 is flawed not because of its imperfect separation of powers but because its effectiveness ultimately relies upon the individuals occupying the various offices of state power and much less upon the ideals on which the Constitution is based. Such a document requires amendment--while this situation was tolerable with a generally reformist Yeltsin as president, it could become disastrous with more reactionary or authoritarian leader in power, as Vladimir Putin may prove to be.(140) Meanwhile, those advocating democratic reform in Russia find themselves trapped in a paradox. Support for a traditional democratic separation of powers between the legislative and executive branches in Russia would give the communist-nationalist-dominated Duma an increased role in setting the future of the country, which could well lead to the destruction of any kind of a democratic system in Russia. Yet to enable Russia to advance toward a democratic, capitalist system demands that democrats turn a blind eye to the imbalance of powers granted by the Constitution.

A. Uneasy Cooperation: 1994-1997

Given the violence surrounding the adoption of the new Constitution(141) and the subsequent election of a Duma dominated by opposition parties, the president in this era was virtually guaranteed a fractious relationship with the legislative branch. Indeed, the Duma almost immediately confronted Yeltsin by granting amnesty both to the coup leaders of the August 1991 plot to overthrow Gorbachev, as well as to the occupants of the parliament building in September-October 1993.(142) Yet despite the arguable unconstitutionality of the act,(143) the president allowed the amnesty and refrained from further provocation of the Duma.(144) By acting in deference to stability and cooperation, the president set a constructive tone for the new Russian constitutional republic.(145)

1. Budget Battles

During these first years of the Second Russian Republic, the annual budget debate allowed the president and parliament to demonstrate both confrontation and compromise. Although the 1996 budget was approved by New Year's Day,(146) the 1995 and 1997 budgets passed the Duma's scrutiny in the spring, only after five months of acrimonious haggling.(147) The two sides differed over the extent of governmental spending. The president sought to temper the state's outlays, under pressure from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), while the Duma generally attempted to expand social programs to placate its impoverished electoral power base.(148) Each branch nonetheless engaged in a process of discussion and amendment of spending proposals, facilitated by a "government-parliamentary conciliation commission.(149)

Unfortunately, while the policy debates over the budget would appear to promote democratic discourse in Russia,(150) external realities and the constitutional imbalance of powers both serve to undermine that potential benefit. Duma deputies and Federation Council representatives alike recognize the necessity of passing a workable budget in order to prove to the IMF and to voters that Russia could manage its own finances,(151) Moreover, the economic situation in post-Soviet Russia does not permit the parties to hold the budget hostage for political gain.(152) Other deputies, however, note the ability of the president to circumvent the budget approval process by issuing decrees,(153) As a result, the process appears to be more of a perfunctory exercise in democracy and the rule of law, rather than a means of implementing concrete policies. Nevertheless, that the president and the Duma engage in the process demonstrates a deference to constitutional procedures, and to that end, suggests future institutional stability.