The rise and fall of Defense Manufacturing Technology programs

Manufacturing & Technology News, Sept 1, 2005 by Richard L. Engwall

The Department of Defense's Manufacturing Technology (Mantech) program was established in the late 1950s "in response to a growing need for advanced production processes in order to produce DOD material more efficiently and more effectively" (6, 8)

In 1975, the Secretary of Defense recognizing the Mantech program's potential value "directed the services to increase their emphasis on and support the ManTech program." (1)

In 1986, the National Research Council's Manufacturing Studies Board issued a report (3) that broadened the scope of the program to require a "total systems approach encompassing all design and manufacturing functions, operations of subcontractors, whims of customers as well as material transformation." The study said that manufacturing technology "is essential for maintaining a strong industrial base [and] is critical to weapon systems availability and affordability." It also directed the program to fund process technology development "best suited for long-range, generic problems." It said the Mantech program's continuation was "essential for maintaining a strong industrial base" and that it was "critical to weapon systems availability and affordability." (2)

A number of defense industrial base studies were conducted in the mid- to late-1980s addressing defense industrial competitiveness, all of which articulated the need to address the eroding industrial base and for DOD to address manufacturing process technology development up front in the early phases of science and technology." (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9)

During the mid-1980s, ManTech was moved from DOD's procurement operation to its R&D shop to take advantage of the program's potential impact on product design. In 1988, the Pentagon's top management team led by Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Robert Costello created a Defense Manufacturing Board modeled after the Defense Science Board and established a Manufacturing Strategy Committee within the National Academy of Sciences. He also created a "Production Base Advocate."

Embedded within Costello's comprehensive plan was a strategic thrust establishing defense industrial base strategic plans and an "emphasis on developing manufacturing capabilities concurrent with the development of weapons systems and ensuring that industrial base issues benefit from the full spectrum of potential policy remedies."

In May 1989, the Center for Strategic and International Studies issued a major industrial base report (6) co-sponsored by Sens. Jeff Bingaman (D-N.M.) and John McCain (R-Ariz.). It found there to be an "erosion of the U.S. defense industrial base." Emphasis was placed on "the rush of commercial firms away from the defense business" further limiting the availability of leading-edge production capability. "Legislation, policies and programs designed to deal with the problems of the defense industrial base are needed," said the report. In the fiscal year 1991 science and technology budget as reported by Charles Herzfeld, Director of Defense for Research and Engineering, flexible manufacturing was added as one of DOD's "critical technologies." These technologies fit into five clusters--the third being materials and manufacturing processes. Herzfeld said the development of process technology "must be an integral part of the overall development of product technology." Furthermore, "innovative process technologies are a key to reversing long-term acquisition trends towards escalating unit costs, lengthening lead times and increasing difficulties in incorporating technological advances into systems." (10) A fifth cluster of critical technologies was added for "technical infrastructure, which included such technologies as modeling and simulation, information system and training systems." At the time, DARPA started to focus an extensive amount of its resources on manufacturing R&D, at a rate of more than twice what the ManTech budget had been.

Under the first Bush administration, a multi-year, multi-billion-dollar Advanced Manufacturing Initiative (AMI) was created, followed by the $475-million Technology Reinvestment Project (TRP). This program was passed in 1992 under the new Clinton administration with bipartisan support. In subsequent years, additional manufacturing technology funding was provided by the National Institute of Standards and Technology's Advanced Technology Program (ATP), the Department of Energy's Technology Enabling Agility Manufacturing (TEAM) program, and the Agile Manufacturing program sponsored jointly by DARPA and NSF.

Industry and Congress--not the Department of Defense--pushed all of these manufacturing technology programs. During this time, Mantech funding stayed relatively constant. (11, 14)

On December 19, 1991, a Deputy Secretary of Defense memo introduced the new "Seven Major S&T Thrusts for Defense S&T." The seventh thrust was "Technology For Affordability." (13) By 1993, this thrust was established as the critical technology in the DDR&E's new Science & Technology Strategy. Michael McGrath, former Director of CALS, was appointed executive director of manufacturing at DARPA.