Crime and punishment in Major League Baseball: the case of the designated hitter and hit batters

Economic Inquiry, Jan, 2007 by John Charles Bradbury, Douglas J. Drinen

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The second factor was an important rule change in the punishment for hitting batters that significantly altered the cost of retaliating against pitchers who hit batters. In 1994, MLB adopted the "double-warning" rule, which authorized umpires to warn both teams if an umpire judges that a pitcher intentionally hits or attempts to hit a batter. (19) Once the umpire issues a warning, retaliation results in the immediate expulsion of the current pitcher and manager of the offending team, accompanied by monetary fines. This statutory constraint significantly raised the cost of retaliation, which, in turn, lowered the probability of punishment to pitchers for initially hitting batters. With the double-warning rule, pitchers can take risks that are more likely to result in hit batters than without the rule because pitchers know the opposition will be less likely to retaliate due to the increased penalty after the umpire issues a warning. The relative rise in the NL rate of hit batsmen in the 1990s is consistent with the deterrence hypothesis and therefore is expected. NL pitchers are now more protected from retaliation than before the double-warning rule, thereby inducing NL pitchers to behave more like their counterparts in the AL. A similar phenomenon occurred in Japanese professional baseball. The Nippon Professional Baseball League, which also has the DH in only one league, experienced a similar convergence of hit batsmen after several years of excessive hit batsmen in the DH league. Kawaura and La Croix (2002) find that this convergence correlates with a rule change that increased the penalty for intentionally hitting batters. Thus, the statutory constraint designed to limit hit batters likely had the unintended consequence of doing the opposite.

Finally, using game-level (not play by play) data from 1973 to 2003, Bradbury and Drinen (forthcoming) find that games in which the DH is allowed are associated with more hit batters than non-DH games, controlling for many relevant factors. Over the entire 31-year history of the DH, the 4 years in which the NL rate exceeded the NL rate appear to be exceptions rather than the rule. When relevant historical facts are included in the analysis, it is clear that the 1990s actually lend support to, rather than cast doubt upon, the deterrence explanation for differences in hit batsmen between leagues. The most recent history of hit batsmen rates is indicative of a return to the pre-1990s league differences in hit batsmen, with a tempering of the difference by the double-warning rule.

VII. CONCLUSION

Competing economic theories predict that DH rule is responsible for raising the rate of hit batsmen in the AL above the NE. As Figure 1 illustrates, for the 3 decades following the introduction of the DH the AL hit batsmen rate remained higher than the NL rate for all but 4 years. However, there is less agreement regarding the cause of this difference. While the lower cost of hitting batters for AL pitchers, who do not have to bat and face reciprocal retaliation, is a likely explanation, it is not the only explanation. An alternate hypothesis is that the DH increases the incidence of hit batters by altering the composition of the batting lineup. Replacing a poor-hitting pitcher with a good-hitting DH raises the marginal benefit to hitting an additional batter in the lineup in the AL. Additionally, the retaliation threat to pitchers may be too small to be relevant. If retaliation is not likely, there is no cost differential to pitchers between leagues to explain the hit batsmen difference.