Crime and punishment in Major League Baseball: the case of the designated hitter and hit batters

Economic Inquiry, Jan, 2007 by John Charles Bradbury, Douglas J. Drinen

Past empirical analyses of the competing hypotheses to explain the hit batsmen differential have relied on yearly aggregate data. However, the explicit cost-benefit analysis of the pitcher at the time of a pitch is not observable with aggregate data. Using two new unique data sets we have been able to observe the costs and benefits of hitting batters during individual plate appearances. Therefore, we isolate the predicted effects of the competing hypotheses and determine the impact of many relevant factors that influence the pitcher's consumption of risk in hitting a batter every time a hitter steps to the plate. Controlling for variables that proxy batter quality, pitcher quality, retaliation, and game situation, we find that the DH rule increases the likelihood that any batter will be hit during a plate appearance between 11% and 17%. This explains approximately 60%-80% of the hit batsmen rate differential between leagues. Furthermore, we observe retaliation against plunking pitchers, which is necessary for the deterrent explanation. In total, the findings support the fact that requiring pitchers to bat deters them from hitting batters. Though other factors are important in the economics of plunking, the threat of retaliation plays a nontrivial role. Players really do "take care of it" themselves through an informal enforcement mechanism, while official enforcement penalties may have, in fact, exacerbated the problem of hit batters.

ABBREVIATIONS

AL: American League

DH: Designated Hitter

MLB: Major League Baseball

NL: National League

OPS: On-Base Percentage Plus Slugging percentage

doi:10.1093/ei/cb1014

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