Solidary and functional costs: explaining the presidential appointment contradiction.

Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, October, 2004 by Gill, Jeff; Waterman, Richard W.

ADDRESSING A CONTRADICTION

There is a fundamental puzzle in the executive appointment literature. Presidential and bureaucratic scholars now argue that political appointments represent the single greatest source of presidential influence over the bureaucracy. Yet it is easy to observe that these executives tend to remain on the job for only short periods. By the time they master the complex responsibilities of public management at a high level, they are inclined to leave government. How is it then possible for political appointees to be a primary source of presidential power while simultaneously serving so briefly? We call this phenomenon the presidential appointment contradiction because a widely accepted theory appears to conflict with empirical observation....

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