In solidarity with the imprudent: a defense of luck egalitarianism

Social Theory and Practice, April, 2007 by Shlomi Segall

Luck egalitarians hold that inequalities are unjust when they are the outcome of individuals' unchosen natural and social circumstances. (1) Accordingly, they hold that justice requires compensating individuals only for disadvantages for which one cannot be held responsible. Arguably, it follows that luck egalitarians must deny our obligation to provide assistance to those who come to need it through their own fault, for example, an emergency service to a reckless driver or a liver transplant to a persistent alcoholic. Many believe that these counterintuitive cases, what Elizabeth Anderson calls "the abandonment of negligent victims" objection, (2) demonstrate that luck egalitarianism is defective as a theory of justice. I shall argue that luck egalitarianism can escape the abandonment objection, if, when applied to social policy, it were to be complemented with other moral considerations (including other considerations of justice), such as those of social solidarity.

Anderson's article has received much attention since its publication, from both supporters and detractors, (3) so I shall refrain from rehearsing the full details of her attack on luck egalitarianism. Rather, I wish to observe that Anderson has three main concerns. First, luck egalitarians, she claims, are harsh on victims of option luck, for they abandon such victims to their dire fates. (4) Second, Anderson states, luck egalitarians also err in the way they treat victims of brute luck. In order to establish a person's entitlement to compensation, luck egalitarians resort to reducing that person to a combination of choices and chances. Such a process is demeaning in its own right, she says, and moreover it requires much information, gathering which is an intrusive process. (5) Third, luck egalitarianism misses the point of equality, according to Anderson, namely, the idea of freedom from hierarchy and oppression, and of having a society that is not ruled by caste or class difference. (6) Instead, Anderson argues that the point of equality is to end oppression between individuals, both as citizens and in personal relationships. Her own ideal, that of "democratic equality," envisages a society in which individuals stand to all other citizens in a relationship of fundamental equality of status.

Although I do not agree with Anderson's second and third claims, my concern here is primarily with her first objection, which for the sake of brevity I shall call "the abandonment objection." My concern, then, is not with the way luck egalitarians treat (or mistreat) victims of brute luck, but rather with the way luck egalitarians treat (or fail to treat) those suffering the effects of bad option luck. Despite Anderson, I claim that luck egalitarians can escape this objection unscathed. While I agree with her that the solution is not to be found within luck egalitarianism, I will demonstrate that the luck-egalitarian account of distributive justice does not forbid helping the imprudent. (7)

I devote here considerable space to examining recent luck-egalitarian responses to the abandonment objection. I examine six such responses: one that seeks to redefine "luck egalitarianism" itself (section 1), and five more standard luck-egalitarian responses (section 2). After concluding that these responses cannot, for different reasons, meet the abandonment objection, I go on to discuss what alternative account could meet that objection. In order to do so, I need to justify the use of what is essentially a nonegalitarian reason (to treat the imprudent) in defense of a theory that is essentially a theory of egalitarian distributive justice (section 3). In section 4 I examine and rebut three potential objections to my proposed strategy for responding to the abandonment objection (that of trading off egalitarian justice against other, nonegalitarian, considerations). In the final section (5) I suggest that the principle of solidarity is one such consideration that could complement luck egalitarianism, and as such, can potentially lay to rest the abandonment objection.

1. "Brute Luck Egalitarianism" or "Option Luck Egalitarianism"?

Luck-egalitarian responses to the abandonment objection claim that, despite Anderson, luck egalitarianism is not only compatible with compensating victims of option luck but actually requires doing so. I examine six different such responses: one "radical" response that questions the very foundations of luck egalitarianism (in this section), and five more standard luck-egalitarian responses (in the next section).

The first response to the abandonment objection that I shall look at questions the relevance of the distinction, seemingly essential to luck egalitarianism, between brute and option luck. The argument begins by noting that it is a central tenet of luck egalitarianism that luck is morally arbitrary. But then it goes on to point out that option luck is as morally arbitrary as brute luck, and therefore also should be neutralized. (8) We may refer to this view as "option luck egalitarianism" (to distinguish it from the commitment to merely neutralize brute luck). Thomas Christiano, one of the advocates of this view, asks us to think of two individuals who take a similar risk and, subsequently, one of them succeeds while the other fails. What distinguishes their unequal fate is only luck, not their choices. (9) And since the effects of luck are morally arbitrary, it is the case that victims of bad option luck should be compensated, the same way as victims of bad brute luck are. Thus, luck egalitarians are in fact not committed to abandoning the imprudent.