Alfred Korzybski

ETC.: A Review of General Semantics, Winter, 2003 by Neil Postman

The world, in other words, is not an Aristotelian world where things are either A or not-A and where the syllogism reigns supreme. Aristotle's "laws of thought" are rules for the clear, non-contradictory use of language (at least, IndoEuropean languages) but are not necessarily the best guide to grasping the nature of a process world. A "cup" is a "cup" only so long as we are talking about the word itself. In that case, a "cup" cannot also be a "container." A word is either what it is or not what it is, and cannot be both at the same time. But the thing itself--that is another matter. The thing is not even a thing but a complex process, changing from moment to moment. "It" may be called by many different names simultaneously and without contradiction, depending on the context in which it is experienced and the level of abstraction at which it is symbolized. In such a world, our language cannot even confidently label what is a "cause" and what is an "effect."

Korzybski believed that scientists understand this, which explains why they now map the world almost entirely in the language of mathematics. Mathematics, particularly in its modern forms, has a greater correspondence to the structure of reality than does ordinary language, and, as a consequence, has made possible the development of non-Euclidean, Einsteinian, probabilistic, and indeterminate perspectives. In Science and Sanity, Korzybski made a strong plea for a new semantic cartography, which he called non-Aristotelian, and which would be comparable in its impact on the thought of ordinary people to the impact of mathematics on the scientific community. His non-Aristotelian perspective requires that we learn and internalize the most up-to-date assumptions and understandings about the structure of the world: the word, for example, is not the thing; no two events in the world are identical; no one can say everything about an event; things are undergoing continuous change; et cetera.

In order for us to act as if we understand these ideas (they are usually labeled "obvious" by those whose behavior shows the least evidence of their being understood), we must accustom ourselves to new ways of talking about the world, and Korzybski put forward a set of practical modifications of our habitual patterns of speech. He recommended, for example, that we reduce as much as possible our uses of the verb "to be." This verb, employed in about one-third of all English sentences, not only promotes the notion that the map is the territory but also encourages a false-to-fact kind of projection. When we say "John is smart," we create the impression that "smartness" is a property of John, that John possesses "smartness." But in fact John's "smartness" exists in the eyes of his beholder. Through a kind of grammatical alchemy, the real subject of this sentence--the person who makes the judgment--has disappeared, and John, who is in fact the object of someone else's evaluation, is made to appear as the main "actor." To help us understand this kind of sentence--to grasp that smartness is not "in" people--Korzybski suggested the frequent use of "to me" phrases, e.g., "It seems to me ...," "From my point of view ...," "As I see it ...," et cetera. He also recommended the frequent use of time-markers, which he called "dating." When we use a name, for example, we should accustom ourselves to affixing a date to it so that we will remember that people and things change over time, e.g., S. I. Hayakawa(1951), the Supreme Court(1975), New York University(1965), and so on. To assist in helping ourselves remember that things with the same name are different, Korzybski recommended that we employ a simple form of indexing, e.g., Roman Catholic[.sub.1], is not Roman Catholic[.sub.2], German[.sub.1], is not German[.sub.2], and so on. In this way we discourage ourselves from speaking about "all professors" or "all students" or "all cups." Korzybski also recommended that we accustom ourselves to punctuating our assertions about the world with silent "et ceteras," to remind ourselves that we have not said and cannot say everything that could be said. And he proposed a variety of methods to remind ourselves that our verbal maps must undergo periodic evaluation to accommodate changes in reality. Korzybski, it must be stressed, did not have much patience with those who practiced general semantics only at the verbal level. It is entirely possible, he found, to incorporate his recommendations into one's language repertoire in a mechanical way, that is, without altering one's perceptions and evaluations of the world. However, Korzybski believed that by studying general semantics deeply and by developing new language habits, we could reeducate our "neuro-semantic" systems and thus reduce social conflict and a variety of psychological disorders. He believed, in short, that he had pointed the way toward a humane and scientific method of ordinary discourse.