Singapore's climate change policy: the limits of learning

Contemporary Southeast Asia, Dec, 2006 by Natasha Hamilton-Hart

Introduction

Until 2005, Singapore completely rejected the possibility of adopting the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UN FCCC), which is the only international instrument that commits parties to any kind of greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction targets. In 2006, Singapore became the 168th country to adopt the protocol. This article explores Singapore's changing policy on the issue of climate change, both in terms of its position regarding international cooperation on the issue and in terms of its domestic energy policy. How substantially has Singapore's policy changed, and what are the reasons behind its decision to accept the Kyoto Protocol?

While the direct consequences of Singapore's decision to accede to the protocol are unlikely to be that significant at a global level, the reasons for its decision are worth exploring. At the local level, examining the evolution of Singapore's policy throws light on a policy process in which foreign policy, environmental policy and energy policy intersect. At the global level, understanding the influences on Singapore's climate change policy can contribute to a better understanding of the routes by which the global climate change regime may be strengthened. This article examines two routes suggested by theories regarding the diffusion of international norms and the relationship between development and environmental policy.

Policy Change: The Significance of Competing Explanations

On the surface, Singapore's adoption of the Kyoto Protocol is insignificant. The country of less than four million inhabitants accounts for only 0.2 per cent of global GHG emissions, and thus does not contribute that much to increasing concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. (1) It is possible to argue that Singapore's accession marks a step towards universal acceptance of the protocol and thus helps legitimate the UN FCCC regime as the vehicle for securing international agreement to curb GHG emissions. (2) While this regime remains limited, it represents nearly two decades of international negotiations on the issue and thus offers the best chance for reaching more extensive agreements. (3) Critically, however, the future of the global climate change regime depends on further strengthening its provisions and extending its coverage. While the Kyoto Protocol entered into force in February 2005, its emissions reduction targets are unlikely to do much to mitigate future climate change, for several reasons: first, the United States, which leads the world in GHG emissions (accounting for nearly a quarter of total global emissions), has rejected the protocol; second, several of the countries that did accept emissions targets when adopting the Kyoto Protocol either made very limited commitments and/or are unlikely to be able to meet their commitments (Dessler and Pearson 2006 pp. 129-30); third, developing countries, even though many have adopted the protocol, have not accepted any emission reduction targets; finally, the protocol only governs commitments until 2012.

Given the need to strengthen and broaden the global regime, understanding why a country took an overt step towards acceptance of its objectives is potentially important. However, the lessons that can be derived from Singapore's policy shift depend on the details of its policy and the reasons behind them. Does its policy shift signal a kind of environmental maturing--a change to the country's attitudes towards environmental risks and values as a result of increasing material affluence and exposure to global environmental norms? Alternatively, is Singapore's policy shift simply the result of a reevaluation of the short-term, narrowly economic, costs and benefits of the Kyoto Protocol?

New Perceptions of Environmental Risks and Values?

In this line of explanation, Singapore's decision to accede to the Kyoto Protocol came about as a result of a change in the country's perception of environmental risks and values. These would include a new readiness to accept the accept the scientific evidence that global climate change is occurring as a result of anthropogenic activity and that it poses a serious threat to future welfare. Willingness to mitigate climate change also implies an attitude to environmental risks that leans towards the "precautionary principle", which argues that governments and societies have an interest and obligation to manage potential environmental risks even in the presence of scientific uncertainty. (4) This means taking a longer-term view and increasing the value placed on future welfare. It may also, although not necessarily, imply a willingness to recognize a broader definition of welfare, one that places some intrinsic value on environmental goods such as ecosystem stability and diversity, rather than a more narrowly-defined economic measure of welfare. Finally, perceptual change underlying a decision to become more involved in the global climate change regime might involve a reappraisal of a country's interests and obligations regarding international action, including a concern for a country's international reputation or a redefinition of a country's international responsibilities.