Searle and collective intentionality: the self-defeating nature of internalism with respect to social facts - Extensions and Criticisms - John Searle

American Journal of Economics and Sociology, The,  Jan, 2003  by Dan Fitzpatrick

• E-mail
• Print
• Link

Obviously, according to Searle's account, if such rules are to be constitutive and if the function that is imposed is to be intentional, then what satisfies the X term should not be sufficient for satisfying the Y term. So, for instance, "objects that are designed and used to be sat on by one person" as the X term is already sufficient for satisfying the Y term, as in "count as chairs," and therefore cannot be constitutive in the sense that Searle requires. But that certain kinds of bits of paper (X) count as money (Y) is a genuine constitutive rule because the notion of money is not intrinsic to the piece of paper, as it is not a physical property. (1) It is through the acceptance of such constitutive rules that one is able to move from the level of brute facts to that of institutional facts. If everyone accepts that certain pieces of paper issued by the Bureau of Engraving and Printing (X) count as money (Y) in a certain context (C), then such pieces of paper are money, according to this account. Although S earle does not say exactly what the context is supposed to be in this case, it appears that he means C to be the context of the United States.2 In any case, according to his account, the pieces of paper in question are mere physical objects, but it is the status function that is imposed on them that gives rise to the institutional fact, that makes them money in the form of dollar bills. This notion of constitutive rules connects up the world of brute facts and physical objects with the world of institutional facts, according to Searle's analysis.

C. Collective Intentionality

What is fundamental to Searle's account of social reality is that the relevant constitutive rules be collectively accepted. For it to be an institutional fact that certain pieces of paper count as money along the lines of his formula "X counts as Y in C," it must be generally accepted that those pieces of paper are money. This is where Searle's postulation of collective intentionality comes in. According to Searle, all social facts, whether institutional or non-institutional, involve collective intentionality (Searle 1995: 26). (3) But institutional facts are a special subset of social facts because, unlike non-institutional social facts, they involve the imposition or assignment of status functions, according to Searle's constitutive rule formula, "X counts as Y in C." In other words, non-institutional social facts, such as two persons going for a walk together, do not involve the assignment or imposition of status functions according to his constitutive rule formula, "X counts as Y in C," whereas institutio nal facts, such as certain kinds of pieces of paper that count as money, do. I will argue that Searle's postulation of collective intentionality is wrong-headed and ultimately refutable.

II

Searle's Claims Concerning Collective Intentionality

SEARLE'S ACCOUNT OF COLLECTIVE INTENTIONALITY is intended to cover all instances of collective behavior, whether they be human or animal. Not only does he believe that animals are capable of cooperative behavior, he also makes the more controversial claims that many species "share intentional states such as beliefs, desires and intentions" and that collective intentionality is a capacity that we share with animals (Searle 1995: 23). For Searle, collective intentionality covers all kinds of collectively intended activity, whether the activities are those in which the actions that each member of the group performs are identical or highly similar, such as a group of people going for a walk, or those in which the actions that each member of the group performs are highly dissimilar but where there is a common goal, such as instances where "I am doing something only as part of our doing something" (Searle 1995: 23). Examples of the latter include team efforts of all kinds, such as football games or orchestral perfo rmances. Even events that incorporate conflict, such as boxing matches, court cases, or faculty members trading insults at a cocktail party, involve collective intentionality, according to Searle (Searle 1995: 24).