Searle and collective intentionality: the self-defeating nature of internalism with respect to social facts - Extensions and Criticisms - John Searle

American Journal of Economics and Sociology, The,  Jan, 2003  by Dan Fitzpatrick

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The example I am proposing is of an economic exchange that has gone wrong. Exactly what has gone wrong is not of great importance, but for the sake of clarity, let's say that the transaction has actually taken place but that the goods involved have not been delivered by one side. What matters here is that one party is attempting to show that there had been a bona fide economic transaction involving another party and that the latter has reneged on the transaction. Let us also assume that this aggrieved party has resorted to the law to prove his case. In court the defendant claims that there never had been an economic transaction at all. In examining such a no-transaction defense on behalf of one party, a court is usually expected to review any evidence to establish or indicate whether there has actually been either a transaction or any intention to enter into the transaction by the defendant. Statements made in front of third parties, undertakings entered into at the time, letters, invoices, written contracts, signed delivery dockets, or down-payment receipts are the sort of evidence that a court may examine in determining whether there has been a bonafide economic transaction or contract. (13)

But if we are to follow Searle's account, the defendant in this case can simply deny that there had ever been a social or institutional fact in the form of the putative economic transaction, despite any purported evidence to the contrary, because he can claim that he had not harbored any relevant we-intention in relation to such a putative transaction. While the defendant cannot say anything about what went on in the plaintiff's head, according to Searle's account, he does know for certain what went on inside his own head and no one else can gainsay that. Since, in accordance with Searle's account, neither the plaintiff nor anyone else is in a position to say what went on inside the defendant's head and since, as I pointed out earlier, Searle claims that any party to a putative social fact can be radically mistaken about whether there ever was such a social fact, if the court were to accept Searle's account of social facts it could not enforce contracts or economic transactions in this way. Any purported exte rnal evidence, such as invoices, signed contracts, or the like, would not be admissible because such evidence could never establish that a social fact had actually occurred because it could never establish collective intentionality inside the relevant heads at the appropriate time. As the ballet in the park example is meant to show, a case of behavior that does not involve collective intentionality may, when viewed externally, be indistinguishable from another case that does involve collective intentionality. The purported evidence may be consistent with facts that are not social facts. In our example the defendant can simply claim that he had not harbored any relevant we-intention with respect to an economic transaction and had merely signed pieces of paper because he likes doing so. Alternatively, his actions may be consistent with social facts that are not related to the collective intentionality in question; for instance, the defendant can claim that he harbored a we-intention with respect to the other pa rty but that it was to engage in role-play, to act as if they were engaging in an economic transaction without actually engaging in such a transaction.