1 From a state of war to perpetual peace

American Journal of Economics and Sociology, The, Jan, 2007 by Edward Demenchonok

   And even though wars often cost more than the economic return they
   generate, Liberal republics are prepared to protect and
   promote--sometimes forcibly--democracy, private property, and the
   rights of individuals overseas in nonrepublics that, because they
   do not authentically represent the right of individuals, have
   incomplete right to noninterference. (17)

He admits: "These wars may liberate oppressed individuals overseas; [but] they also can generate enormous suffering." (18) Still, Doyle thinks that the price in suffering is worth paying since, in his view, the only way toward world peace is through spreading democracy, sometimes forcibly, and through the global expansion of the liberal zone: "the occasion for wars with non-Liberals would disappear as non-Liberal regimes disappeared." (19) Many critics, however, see this as a recipe for "perpetual war" rather than "perpetual peace."

Yet Doyle insists that this theory, which promotes war in the name of democracy and peace, is perfectly compatible with Kant, thus portraying Kant as an adherent of "liberal peace." As Doyle writes:

   Kant's own position is ambiguous. He regards most of these wars as
   unjust and warns liberals of their susceptibility to them. At the
   same time, Kant argues that each nation "can and ought to" demand
   that its neighboring nations enter into the pacific union of
   liberal states--that is, become republican. (20)

Here, Kant is portrayed not as a consistent principled champion of peace but rather as "ambiguous," as making an exception for (and morally justifying) the forcible "republicanization" of other states.

However, the passages from Kant's "Toward Perpetual Peace" to which Doyle refers show that Kant was unequivocally consistent in his condemnation of war. The first reference is from Kant's explanation of the third definite article on cosmopolitan right, in which he condemns colonial wars and points out the "inhospitable conduct of the civilized states" and "the injustice they display in visiting foreign countries" and actually conquering them. As an example, Kant mentions the colonization of India, to which "foreign troops were brought in under the pretext of merely setting up trading posts." (21) The second reference is from Kant's second definite article about the rights of nations based on the federation of free states:

   Each nation, for the sake of its own security, can and ought to
   demand of the others that they should enter along with it into a
   constitution, similar to the civil one, within which the rights
   of each could be secured. This would mean establishing a
   federation of peoples. (22)

Here, Kant writes about the moral obligation of states to seek their security and peace through lawful alliances with their neighbors. Kant's "ought" refers to the moral obligation of each nation to seek peaceful alliances with other states and, therefore, to be open and

inclusive. The purpose of this is the collective security of the members of the federation, not forcing them all to become republican states. Contrary to Doyle's claim, there is no "ambiguity" in these passages; Kant is consistent in condemning war and championing peace. Kant also mentions the rights of peace, which include "the right to form alliances or confederate leagues of several states for the purpose of communal defense against any possible attacks from internal or external sources." But he emphasizes the difference of these alliances from expansionist military-political blocs, insisting that "these [alliances] must never become leagues for promoting aggression and internal expansion." (23)