3 Rethinking global justice from the perspective of all living nature and what difference it makes

American Journal of Economics and Sociology, The, Jan, 2007 by James P. Sterba

Nevertheless, in order to avoid imposing an unacceptable sacrifice on the members of our own species, we can also justify a preference for humans on grounds of defense. Thus, we have:

3. A principle of human defense: Actions that defend oneself and other human beings against harmful aggression are permissible even when they necessitate killing or harming individual animals or plants, or even destroying whole species or ecosystems.

Lastly, we need one more principle to deal with violations of the above three principles. Accordingly, we have:

4. A principle of rectification: Compensation and reparation are required when the other principles have been violated.

Obviously, this principle is somewhat vague, but for those who are willing to abide by the other three principles, it should be possible to remedy that vagueness in practice. Here, too, would-be human guardians of the interests of nonhumans could have a useful role figuring out what is appropriate compensation or reparation for violations of the principle of disproportionality and, even more importantly, designing ways to get that compensation or reparation enacted.

VI

An Objection from a Somewhat Alien Perspective

THERE REMAINS, HOWEVER, at least one serious objection to the view that I have been defending. It might be argued that from a somewhat alien perspective my view is not nonanthropocentric enough. Consider the following.

Suppose our planet were invaded by an intelligent and very powerful species of alien that can easily impose their will upon us. Suppose these aliens have studied the life history of our planet and they have come to understand how we have wreaked havoc on our planet, driving many species into extinction, and how we still threaten many other species with extinction. In short, suppose these aliens discover that we are like a cancer on our biosphere.

Suppose further that these aliens are fully aware of the differences between us and the other species on the planet. Suppose they clearly recognize that we more closely resemble them in power and intelligence than any other species on the planet does. Even so, suppose the aliens still choose to protect those very species we threaten. They begin by forcing us to use no more resources than we need for a decent life, and this significantly reduces the threat we pose to many endangered species. However, the aliens want to do more. In order to save more endangered species, they decide to exterminate a certain portion of our human population, reducing our numbers to those we had when we were more in balance with the rest of the biosphere.

Now if this were to happen, would we have moral grounds to object to these actions taken by the aliens? Of course, we could argue that it would be unreasonable for us to do more than restrict ourselves to the resources we need for a decent life, and so we are not morally required to do more. But these aliens need not deny this. They may recognize that the extermination of a certain portion of the human population is not something that humans could reasonably require of each other. What the aliens are claiming, as champions of endangered species, is simply the right to impose a still-greater restriction on humans, recognizing, at the same time, a comparable right of humans to resist that imposition as best they can. Of course, in the imagined case, any resistance by humans would be futile; the aliens are just too powerful.