3 Rethinking global justice from the perspective of all living nature and what difference it makes

American Journal of Economics and Sociology, The, Jan, 2007 by James P. Sterba

Accordingly, even though we can envision the perspective of hypothetical aliens and radical Earth Firsters and recognize that it is a morally permissible stance to take, this still doesn't undercut the moral defensibility of the principles of human preservation, disproportionality, human defense, and rectification. These principles still capture the moral requirements we can reasonably require all human beings to accept. (11) In fact, the first step of this somewhat alien perspective requires the enforcement of just those principles. It is only at the second step, simply hypothetically justified in the case of the aliens, and virtually never justifiably realized in the case of real-life radical Earth Firsters, that we have a departure from the principles. Hence, the mere possibility of this somewhat alien moral perspective does not undercut the real-life moral defensibility, on both Kantian and utilitarian grounds, of these conflict resolution principles.

VII

Comparing the Requirements of Global Justice

WE ARE NOW IN A POSITION to compare the requirements of global justice when only humans are taken into account with the requirements of global justice when all living beings are taken into account. When only humans are taken into account, I argued on libertarian grounds that we are only entitled to the goods and resources required to meet our basic needs for a decent life--no more. Otherwise, we would be violating the rights of distant peoples and future generations. Somewhat surprisingly, that is almost the same conclusion I arrived at after also taking nonhuman living beings into account. Specifically, the principle of human preservation only permits aggression against nonhuman nature for the sake of what we need for a decent life, and the principle of disproportionality prohibits aggression against nonhuman nature for the sake of nonbasic or luxury needs.

Still, the more inclusive account of global justice does impose some additional obligations. First, in order to avoid unnecessary harm to nonhuman nature, we will have an obligation to meet our basic needs in some ways rather than others. For example, if there were no negative effects on our fellow human beings, it would be permissible for us to meet our basic needs through the consumption of meat and dairy products provided by factory farming, but we can't do this once the interests of particularly farm animals are appropriately taken into account. Second, we will have additional obligations to help nonhuman living beings based on restitution. For example, where we humans have endangered nonhuman species by aggressing against them for the sake of our luxury needs, we would have an obligation to try to restore those species to a flourishing condition. Third, we have an obligation to control our population to a greater extent under a more inclusive global justice than we would under a human-centered global justice. Of course, even in a human-centered global justice, we would need restrictions on population growth. While existing people are not required to sacrifice their basic needs for the sake of future generations, they are required to do what they can to restrict the membership of future generations so that those generations will be able to meet their basic needs. (12)