Comments on four papers on economics and human heterogeneity

American Journal of Economics and Sociology, The, July, 2005 by Malcolm Rutherford

I do not want to argue that the kind of treatment of "the other" suggested by Dimand is entirely absent from classical economics, because it is not, but as Peart and Levy argue in their paper, it is really after the work of Darwin and Galton that the assumption of equal capacity loses ground in economics.

Peart and Levy's paper traces this shift within the early neoclassical economics of Edgeworth. In this paper they make an important distinction between Spencer's evolutionary viewpoint involving laissez-faire and the idea of a directed evolution using eugenic policies. The point also applies to other so-called Social Darwinists, W. G. Sumner, for example, who believed in laissez-faire on survival-of-the-fittest grounds. It is also true, as they point out, that Spencer regarded himself as a utilitarian, although with differences from Mill. Sidgwick (1886) provides an interesting discussion of utilitarianism and various versions of "Evolutional Ethics," including Spencer's. The key point in Spencer's argument is that, "for ethical purposes," actions conducive to the maximum of life and those conducive to the maximum of happiness coincide. Spencer's point of view was not, however, widely adopted among evolutionists, who generally adopted a more biological or sociological criterion. Darwin's alternative to the greatest happiness principle, that of the "general good," is a case in point.

I found it fascinating that Edgeworth sought to modify utilitarian ideas to allow for differential capacities for happiness and in a fashion that clearly accommodated eugenic ideas. However, I think it is worth mentioning that J. S. Mill also wanted to distinguish pleasures on the grounds of their qualities, so there may be some background here that is not brought out. How big a step is it from arguing that there are "higher" pleasures to the argument that some (more cultured) individuals have a higher capacity for pleasure? Also, the paper does not discuss the issue of how broadly the idea of differential capacity for pleasure was adopted within neoclassical economics. Given the explosive growth in the popularity of eugenic ideas, one might have expected it to become widely accepted.

The Cot and Leonard papers deal with closely related issues, so I will discuss them together. That eugenic and racist arguments were a common part of American Progressive Era social science is entirely beyond dispute. Cot's paper deals with the central role played by Irving Fisher in the American eugenic movement. Eugenic argumentation was most pronounced in the American debates over immigration, but as Tim Leonard, in this paper and in previous papers, makes clear, there was a significant role played by eugenic and "race improvement" ideas in the arguments made for things such as minimum wage laws and laws restricting the hours of work for women and children. None of this can be in dispute, but there are some points that I think are important to stress.

Cot mentions economists such as F. A. Walker, W. Z. Ripley, J. R. Commons, T. N. Carver, Irving Fisher, Frank Fetter, William Willcox, and several others as adopting eugenic ideas. This is quite correct, but these people cover a broad range of American economics from conservative to progressive, and their agendas differ. For people such as Fisher, who was a leading figure in the American eugenics movement, the eugenic program of race improvement was the central concern. For Fisher the issue was protecting the quality of the race, and economic policy should be adjusted to that goal.