Classical equality: on the content of analytical egalitarianism

American Journal of Economics and Sociology, The, July, 2008 by Joseph Persky

I

Introduction

AMONG PHILOSOPHERS, it has become something of a commonplace that "equality" is a particularly difficult word. (1) Equality carries a range of meanings and connotations. Still, how we conceptualize equality does matter, precisely because an agreed definition seems to require a political commitment. (2) Sandra Peart and David Levy in The "Vanity of the Philosopher" From Equality to Hierarchy in Post-Classical Economics champion a concept of "analytical egalitarianism." Analytical egalitarianism is reconstructed from the classical writing of British political economy from Adam Smith to John Smart Mill. As such, it doesn't correspond exactly to any of the crop of currently popular "equalities." Nevertheless, given its breadth, aspects of this reconstruction touch on a number of different egalitarian conceptions, including: (1) equality of capacity and talent, (2) racial equality, (3) equality in the marketplace, (4) equality of opportunity, (5) equality of material conditions, (6) equality of happiness, (7) equality before God, and (8) political equality.

This paper briefly considers the relation of each of these equalities to Peart and Levy's analytical egalitarianism. The hope is that such exercises can help elucidate Peart and Levy's reinterpretation of classical economic ideas about equality. Amid these peregrinations, a central theme does emerge. Peart and Levy, echoing the classical economists themselves, seem reluctant to follow their radical openings to logical conclusions.

II

Equalities

A. Equality of Capacity and Talent

If Vanity did nothing else, it would be a valuable contribution for its drawing sharp and long overdue attention to Adam Smith's radical position on the equality of natural talents. (3) In the Smith quote that introduces Chapter 1 of Vanity and contributes a central phrase ("the vanity of the philosopher") to the book's title, Smith compares the street porter to the philosopher and concludes that before education they were much the same. The passage (according to Edwin Cannan in his famous edition of Smith's Wealth of Nations (1776)) was probably written in opposition to Joseph Harris's Essay Upon Money and Coins (1757).

Harris anticipated Smith in emphasizing the importance of the division of labor to modern economies. But unlike Smith, Harris rooted the division of labor in people's intrinsic differences: "Men are endued [sic] with various talents and propensities, which naturally dispose and fit them for different occupations" (1757: 15). The social process of specialization sets the foundation for the accomplishments of true genius. Harris cites several accomplished mechanics. He is rapturous over the achievements of Isaac Newton. These men were "great benefactors to their country" to which they brought "great reputation and wealth" (1757: 16).

In fairness to Harris, he doesn't flail the point, but goes on to add a number of practical considerations having little to do with intrinsic ability. Chief among these, he recognizes the implausible difficulty of one person learning all the skills necessary for their own support. In these comments he sounds much like Smith (or given Harris's earlier date of publication, Smith sounds much like Harris). Harris considers these arguments cumulative and mutually supportive. He draws no sharp opposition between nature and nurture.

But Smith draws just such a contrast. He makes a loud argument for the role of education and other aspects of nurture in shaping our skills and talents. In this observation (again, according to Cannan) he can be recognized as "in accordance with the view of Hume." (4) Hume's comments on "how nearly equal all men are in their bodily force, and even in their mental powers and faculties, till cultivated by education" (Hume 1752: II, xii, 4) arose in a discussion of possible initial social contracts, not the division of labor. Yet the thought very much resonates with Smith. Indeed, it resonates so completely that one wonders if Smith hasn't gone a good deal further than he meant. Perhaps in making a point about the division of labor, he has overstated his case and suggested more than he fully believed.

I suspect that Smith did say more here than he was prepared to defend. He would not be the first to exaggerate his position to make a clean point. The tension is suggested by Smith's own discussion of wage differentials later in the Wealth of Nations. Smith begins, consistently enough, by arguing the role of compensating differentials. In a society of "perfect liberty," he argues, "[i]f in the same neighborhood, there was any employment evidently either more or less advantageous than the rest, so many people would crowd into it in the one case and so many would desert it in the other, that its advantages would soon return to the level of other employments" ([1776] 1937: 138). And he starts very much in this vein with what are clearly compensating differentials: the unpleasantness of an activity, the costs of learning a profession, and the constancy of employment. But then Smith goes on to consider also the "probability of success." Smith puts forward an argument that risky professions and activities are not fully compensated because people overestimate their chances of success. The returns are high, but not as high as might otherwise be expected. For the most part, Smith seems to suggest success in these professions is largely random. But then he waffles: "To excel in any profession, in which but few arrive at mediocrity, is the most decisive mark of what is called genius or superior talents." This seems more than education. And when he moves on to "players, opera singers, opera dancers, etc," the notion of some sort of natural talent is bubbling up through the text. Smith comments on the "rarity and beauty of the talents" and seems almost ready to go over to Harris's position. But then he pulls back a bit: "Such talents, though far from being common, are by no means as rare as is imagined. Many people possess them in great perfection, who disdain to make this use of them; and many more are capable of acquiring them, if any thing could be made honourably by them" ([1776] 1937: 149). Many could acquire these talents, but not all.