18 Clark: apostle of two-factor economics - Part III: nineteenth-century Americas critics

American Journal of Economics and Sociology, The,  Nov, 2003  by Kris Feder

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(21.) Rima, Development of Economic Analysis, pp. 149, 178, 190-91.

(22.) Nicolaus Tideman, "The Economics of Efficient Taxes on Land" in Land and Taxation, Nicolaus Tideman, ed. (London: Shepheard-Walwyn, 1994), pp. 103-21.

(23.) John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy, 7th ed. (1848; New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1987), p. 797.

(24.) Gaffney, "Neoclassical Economics as a Stratagem against Henry George," p. 47.

(25.) George, Progress and Poverty, p. 38.

(26.) Clark sensed the logical difficulty in measuring real inputs by summing their market values, and attempted to develop a theoretically absolute measure of aggregate real capital by appealing to the fundamental identity of utility and cost. The Distribution of Wealth, chap. XXIV.

(27.) Ibid., p. 116.

(28.) Ibid., p. 118.

(29.) Ibid., pp. 119-20.

(30.) Ibid, p. 117.

(31.) Ibid., p. 118.

(32.) George, Progress and Poverty, p. 199.

(33.) Mason Gaffney, "Land as a Distinctive Factor of Production," in Tideman, ed., Land and Taxation. Gaffney points out the circularity of Clark's argument in "Neoclassical Economics as a Stratagem against Henry George," pp. 68-69.

(34.) Clark, The Distribution of Wealth, p. 116.

(35.) Ibid., p. 191.

(36.) George, Progress and Poverty, p. 26.

(37.) Ibid., p. 51.

(38.) Ibid., pp. 218-20.

(39.) Ibid., p. 255.

(40.) Ibid., pp. 263-81. Credit transactions represent "value from obligation" (see below).

(41.) Clark, The Distribution of Wealth, p. 37.

(42.) Ibid., p. xiv.

(43.) Clark, "The Ethics of Land Tenure," p. 68.

(44.) Ibid., p. 75.

(45.) Clark, The Distribution of Wealth, p. 37.

(46.) George, Progress and Poverty, pp. 35-36.

(47.) George, The Science of Political Economy, p. 258.

(48.) Ibid., pp. 257-69.

(49.) George, Progress and Poverty, p. 41.

(50.) Ibid., pp. 39-40.

(51.) George, The Science of Political Economy, p. 260.

(52.) Ibid., pp. 268-69.

(53.) George used a model of pure production to refute the wages-fund theory, which held that wages are paid from the accumulated capital of employers. Progress and Poverty, p. 72.

(54.) Ibid., p. 336.

(55.) George, Progress and Poverty, p. 163.

(56.) George, The Science of Political Economy, p. 411. Italics added.

(57.) Ibid., p. 412.

(58.) Ibid., p. 41.

(59.) Ibid., p. 46.

(60.) Ibid., pp. 48-49.

(61.) Ibid., p. 328.

(62.) Tideman, "The Economics of Efficient Taxes on Land," pp. 130-34.

(63.) George, Progress and Poverty, p. 435.

(64.) Clark, The Distribution of Wealth, p. 3.

(65.) Ibid., p. 9.

(66.) Ibid.

(67.) Ibid., p. 3.

(68.) Ibid., p. 9. Elsewhere, Clark follows George in arguing that competitive equilibrium is defined by the condition of zero profit.

(69.) Clark, "The Ethics of Land Tenure," pp. 63-65.

(70.) Kris Feder, "Henry George on Property Rights: Reply to John Pullen," American Journal of Economics and Sociology 60 (April 2001): 565-79.

(71.) George, Progress and Poverty, pp. 344-45.

(72.) Clark, "The Ethics of Land Tenure," p. 63.

(73.) Ibid., p. 69.