Max Weber: precursor of economic sociology and heterodox economics?

American Journal of Economics and Sociology, The, Nov, 2004 by Helge Peukert

Swedberg's book (1998) on Weber and his idea of economic sociology cannot be summarized adequately. It is the most extensive contribution in the literature and deserves the highest scientific respect. It deals with Weber's economic history, his basic sociological concepts, with Weber on economics and politics, law, and religion. The appendix discusses the evolution of his theory (although his exposition of the German discussion in economics before World War I is not the strongest part of the book). Swedberg stresses the interlocking of (material and ideal) interests and social structures, and asserts that Coleman's rational choice view may come closer to Weber's approach as sociological concepts of Verstehen (1998, p. 4). He purports methodological individualism (social action of individuals). But Swedberg also holds that to state that "[Weber's] sociology represents 'a generalization of marginalist economics' is erroneous and superficial. The notion of 'marginal utility' plays next to no role in his general sociology" (1998, p. 25; see also pp. 28 and 215, fn. 11). Further, he stresses that rational behavior is no transhistorical category for Weber but evolves historically and that different value spheres rule different rational logics. And even in the spheres themselves, different rationalizations take place (1998, p. 36). Swedberg mentions that "he did not want the Grundriss to be dominated either by historical economics or by theoretical economics" (1998, p. 155; see similar remarks on the intention of the Outline on p. 187). He also contrasts Weber and contemporary sociological economics. To cite just two differences, for Weber "the unit of analysis is economic social action, defined as interest-driven action that is oriented to utility and also to the behavior of others" and "[e]conomic action is presumed to be rational until otherwise proven" (1998, p. 163). The opposite mainstream sociological view is that "economic behavior is always embedded in social structure," and "[t]he economy and its institutions can be conceptualized as a form of social construction" (1998, p. 166).

Sometimes one asks if Swedberg is not too affirmative, tries to bridge too much, and leaves the problems of Weber's intended economic sociology in the background, such as when he states, "Weber's model of the market may seem somewhat limited and not very interesting to work with; there is exchange and competition, but not much more. If one ... adds the idea of open and closed economic relationships (as Weber does) one gets a much more dynamic model" (1999, p. 575). Does the well-known open/closed distinction really transform Weber's model dynamically? He also argues that Weber's program is very promising in every respect. In a review, Mote remarks that for Swedberg "the desirability of integrating [Weber] with the approach of mainstream economics to individual behavior is largely assumed; the pros and cons of such a move are never adequately explored.... While Weber also essentially adopted the account of rational behavior in the marginal economics of his time, we now have the benefit of decades of research that overwhelmingly contradicts the simplistic account of individual behavior" (Mote 1999, p. 1041). After this excursion into the literature, we now start with the analysis of the first text.