Professor Choi's response - response to Steven Pressman in this issue, p. 51

American Journal of Economics and Sociology, The,  Jan, 1997  by Young Back Choi

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This conception of convention does not rule out a significant private domain in which individuals may remain idosynchratic, nor is it inconsistent with a steady inflow of new-comers (new borns, immigrants, ones with mid-life crisis, or ones stricken by revelations, etc.) as long as the majority of these can be inducted into the regime of convention.

The approach taken here is radically different from the literature on the evolution of conventions within an equilibrium framework. The typical approach relies on the assumption of the expected utility maximization, in demonstrating how one out of many possible equilibria gets selected. My approach can be best characterized as evolutionary.

Again, Prof. Pressman observes that "Like paradigm, convention is subject to several possible meanings." I do not see it as a problem since conventions, (as workable solutions to the problem of coordination and cooperation), will be observed in all areas of human interaction. Prof. Pressman further observes that "there is a more serious problem here - a chicken and egg problem regarding the relationship between individual paradigms and social conventions." I do not know whether anyone would foolishly try to solve the proverbial chicken and egg problem by claiming the primacy of either chicken or egg. Definitely, I do not. As it should be clear from the mode of reasoning, what I have is a conjectual history that starts from individuals equipped with an ability to learn.

Prof. Pressman also wonders whether conventions are compatible with deviants some of whom might turn out to be entrepreneurs. As mentioned above, the concept of convention, as developed in the book, is not incompatible with the existence of deviants and potential deviations. My convention is not like game theorists' convention which is a static equilibrium concept. My convention is a designation for certain regularities in narrowly defined areas which the majority of people in a community exhibit on their own accord, (without necessarily explicit agreements). It is consistent with idiosyncratic behavior in the private domain and with potentially different reactions to changing circumstances. It is also consistent with the continuous flow of newcomers. Since there is no assurance that the newcomers will learn the existing conventions perfectly and conform, they represent a pool of potential deviations. In a regime of convention, a balance is maintained between the conventional majority and the deviant minorities. I never intended to portray an impossible situation where deviants are completely vanquished.

VII

A Further Analysis of Conventions

Conventions are solutions to problems of uncertainty (especially with regard to the interactions among individuals) that evolve over time. As such, one of their primary requirements is stability, which is supported by people's tendency to conform to them, and to ostracize deviants. It is because in many areas of social life where individual actions have impacts on other's affairs, as in various areas of production and distribution, conventional practices have the presumption of being fair; and unconventional practices, unfair. Also, in a regime of convention, the status quo in social relations, the outcome of conventional practices, is presumptively fair.