A Mindful Approach to Mental Retardation

Journal of Social Issues, Spring, 2000 by Steven Reiss

Steven Reiss [*]

Langer's (1989) concept of mindfulness is analyzed in terms of Reiss's (in press a) 16 desires and then is applied to mental retardation. Mindfulness is motivated by desires for high curiosity, low order, and high independence. High curiosity is satisfied when we mindfully focus attention on individuality, as opposed to when we mindlessly use diagnostic labels to tell us who people are. A desire for low order is satisfied when we apply diagnostic IQ cutoff scores flexibly. A desire for high independence is satisfied when we reject conventional stereotypes. Examples of mindful thinking include the American Association on Mental Retardation's 9th definition of mental retardation, Zigler's approach to personality research, and the recongition of possible co-occurrence of mental illness and mental retardation.

Langer (1989, 1997) introduced the construct of mindfulness. In this article, I put forth a motivational analysis of mindfulness that shows its uniqueness with respect to previous ideas. I then apply Langer' s construct to mental retardation, discussing potentially significant benefits that might derive from a more mindful approach to this population.

Motivational Analysis of Mindfulness

Reflecting her background in cognitive social psychology, Langer has discussed mindfulness primarily as a cognitive skill that can be taught. Although cognitive skills play a critical role in mindfulness, I believe that mindfulness also has a motivational basis. A motivational analysis of mindfulness identifies the basic human needs that are satisfied by mindful thinking; this approach may help us understand better the forces that prod people to think mindfully and, conversely, the forces that may drive people to think mindlessly. I will first explore how the construct of mindfulness might relate to the author's systematic analysis of basic motives or needs (Reiss, in press a).

Reiss and Havercamp (1998) reported a series of factor studies of end motivation. The idea of end motives dates back to Aristotle (350 B.C./1976), who divided motives into ends and means. End motives are things people enjoy for their own sake (e.g., curiosity), whereas means are the methods of satisfying end motives (e.g., reading a book). Each of Reiss's (in press a) 16 basic desires is an end motive. Loosely speaking, end motives can be thought of as primary or elemental motives that combine to form the secondary, compound, or complex motives that determine our goals and desires.

Table 1 shows the 16 end motives that emerged from Reiss and Havercamp's (1998) and Havercamp's (1998) factor studies with 3,361 people in seven independent samples. This figure includes 2,548 people in the Reiss and Havercamp (1998) report and an additional 813 people in Havercamp's (1998) doctoral dissertation. The participants in these studies had diverse backgrounds and included college students, soldiers, legal secretaries, athletes, church group members, fast food workers, human service providers, nursing home residents, people with disabilities, and community volunteers. In addition to a 128-item self-report instrument intended for use with the general population, Reiss and Havercamp (1998) developed a mental retardation ratings version of the Reiss Profile. This instrument has 100 items and is scored into 15 basic motives similar to those assessed by the self-report Reiss Profile. Since both ratings and self-report versions of the Reiss Profile produce similar factor results, the factor results with the self-report instrument should not be attributed to biases sometimes associated with self-report data.

Reiss (in press a) has provided a detailed description of each of the 16 motives, all of which represent categories of intercorrelated end goals. Although the 16 end motives are experienced by nearly everyone, individuals differ with regard to the strength of each motive. Reiss's theory assumes that we are individuals to a greater extent than is sometimes realized. For example, the theory implies that anxiety does not motivate everyone equally but instead does so in accordance with individual sensitivity. Reiss' s theory predicts anxiety disorder based on anxiety sensitivity rather than on how much stress a person experiences. Anxiety sensitivity was widely criticized when first proposed in part because it was a novel construct unsupported by any evidence developed prior to its introduction. Nevertheless, the construct of anxiety sensitivity has gained acceptance based on more than 100 peer-reviewed validity studies, almost all of which have had favorable outcomes (Taylor, 1999).

At first blush, Reiss's system of 16 basic motives may seem to have a number of errors. For example, the system implies that the desire for dependence (low independence) is largely unrelated to the desire for submission (low power). Many psychologists might consider this proposition to be implausible. It is important to understand, therefore, that it is a statement of fact, not theory. We need to keep in mind that Reiss's system is empirically derived, that factorial validity has been demonstrated in three independent confirmatory studies (Havercamp, 1998; Reiss & Havercamp, 1998), and that motivational subscales have been validated against the prediction of meaningful behavior shown over long periods of time. For example, the reason Reiss's system distinguishes between the desire for dependence and the desire for submission is that no meaningful correlation was found between people who disagree with statements like "Self-reliance is very important to me" and those who disagree with the statements like "I en joy being the leader." Further, the distinction is validated by studies of spirituality. Although many psychologists have treated dependence and submission as related motives (Armstrong, 1993), theologians believe that absolute dependence on God (desire to lose independence) leads to strength (power, leadership), not weakness (submission to others). For this to be psychologically possible, the desire for dependence on God must satisfy a different psychological need than does the desire for submission to powerful people. Reiss (in press b) has validated this hypothesis.