Machines and Mindlessness: Social Responses to Computers

Journal of Social Issues, Spring, 2000 by Clifford Nass, Youngme Moon

Clifford Nass [*]

Youngme Moon [*]

Following Langer (1992), this article reviews a series of experimental studies that demonstrate that individuals mindlessly apply social rules and expectations to computers. The first set of studies illustrates how individuals overuse human social categories, applying gender stereotypes to computers and ethnically identifying with computer agents. The second set demonstrates that people exhibit overlearned social behaviors such as politeness and reciprocity toward computers. In the third set of studies, premature cognitive commitments are demonstrated: A specialist television set is perceived as providing better content than a generalist television set. A final series of studies demonstrates the depth of social responses with respect to computer "personality." Alternative explanations for these findings, such as anthropomorphism and intentional social responses, cannot explain the results. We conclude with an agenda for future research.

Computer users approach the personal computer in many different ways. Experienced word processors move smoothly from keyboard to mouse to menu, mixing prose and commands to the computer automatically; the distinction between the hand and the tool blurs (Heidegger, 1977; Winograd & Flores, 1987). Novices cautiously strike each key, fearing that one false move will initiate an uncontrollable series of unwanted events. Game players view computers as windows into other worlds, whereas e-mail users treat the computer as a mere conduit, little different than a telephone. In short, orientations to computers are derived from a host of individual, situational, and technological variables.

Despite this variance, all computer users know a fundamental truth: The computer is not a person and does not warrant human treatment or attribution. It is hard to imagine how one could reach any other conclusion. Unlike dolls or robots, which have faces and bodies, a personal computer [1] looks nothing like a person. It is much less suggestive of a human form than a car, for example, which has headlights for eyes, a hood line for a mouth, and turn signals for facial expressions (McCloud, 1993; Norman, 1992). A computer is unaware of a user's emotions, and it never expresses emotions of its own. It doesn't even refer to itself as "I." Perhaps the clearest list of deficiencies comes from Shylock in The Merchant of Venice (Shakespeare, 1971, p. 215): A computer has "no . . . eyes, ... hands, organs, dimensions, senses, affections, passions.... [It does not] bleed. . . laugh... [or] die."

With such clear and compelling evidence of the differences between computers and people, we [2] have not been surprised that of the thousands of adults who have been involved in our studies, not a single participant has ever said that a computer should be understood in human terms or should be treated as a person. That is, anthropomorphism, the assignment of human traits and characteristics to computers, will be ruled out by the adult participants in our studies (the issue of anthropomorphism and children is more complex; see, for example, Turkle, 1984).

This rejection of anthropomorphism stands in stark contrast to people's actual behavior in our labs and in more naturalistic settings. In this article, we will argue that there is clear evidence that individuals mindlessly (Langer, 1989) apply social rules and expectations to computers. Following Langer's (1989, 1992) explication of mindlessness, we present numerous studies that demonstrate the breadth of individuals' mindless responses to computers. In the first set of experiments, we describe how people tend to overuse human social categories, such as gender and ethnicity, by applying them to computers. In the second set of experiments, we provide evidence that people engage in overlearned social behaviors, such as politeness and reciprocity, toward computers. In the third set of experiments, we describe how people exhibit premature cognitive commitments with respect to computers, as demonstrated by responding to a medium's labeling as a "specialist." To demonstrate the depth of social responses, we descri be a variety of consequences that occur, consistent with the human personality psychology literature, when individuals assign "personality" to a computer. We then argue that alternative explanations for these findings, such as anthropomorphism, intentional social responses, and demand characteristics, cannot explain our observations. We conclude with an agenda for further research.

Mindless Responses to Computers

Mindless behavior, which has been observed in a wide variety of social situations (see Langer, 1989, for a review), occurs as a result of conscious attention to a subset of contextual cues (Langer, 1992). These cues trigger various scripts, labels, and expectations, which in turn focus attention on certain information while diverting attention away from other information. Rather than actively constructing categories and distinctions based on all relevant features of the situation, individuals responding mindlessly prematurely commit to overly simplistic scripts drawn in the past.