Social psychologists' expertise in the public interest: civilian morale research during World War II - Experts in the Service of Social Reform: SPSSI, Psychology, and Society, 1936-1996

Journal of Social Issues, Spring, 1998 by Blair T. Johnson, Diana R. Nichols

Civilian Morale on the Enemy Front: The U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey in Germany

Although they had many means of conducting psychological warfare on enemy citizens, bombing raids were the foremost method that the Allies used against the citizens of Germany and Japan (Morale Division, 1946, 1947). The theory was that the bombs, as literal invasions of the home territory, would demoralize the enemy citizens, reducing their commitment to the war effort and perhaps disrupting production of products necessary to wage war, while also having corporal consequences. Beyond the obvious effects of death and injury, bombing raids also caused widespread destruction of homes, along with evacuations and disruption of utility services for significant periods of time.

So that the government would know the extent to which bombing reduced the morale of the targeted locale, it was necessary to conduct surveys of these areas. Therefore, in 1944, the U.S. government created a new organization called the Strategic Bombing Survey (SBS) and put Likert in charge of its morale division. The SPS's initial charge was to survey Germany; its later charge was to survey Japan. The SBS included a number of divisions, one of which had as its mission the assessment of morale - its dimensions, causes, and consequences. Such was Likert's charisma that those called upon to serve with him usually decided to do so on the spot (see Hyman, 1991). Some took leaves of absence from various government agencies that employed them, whereas others served as consultants in the planning phases of the projects. Likert took leave from DPS, as did some of his colleagues. Others remained in Washington under the interim director, Angus Campbell, as DPS continued its stateside operation. For the German Bombing Survey, Likert brought back some DPS staff who had left him when the division was dropped from the Office of War Information. (As World War II continued, the United States initiated other survey teams, but none staffed as many psychologists as Likert's DPS [Marquis, 1944].) These returnees included Herbert Hyman, Richard Crutchfield, and Daniel Katz. Likert also recruited social psychologists active in other war agencies, namely Theodore Newcomb and Otto Klineberg from Overseas Intelligence, Helen Peak from the War Production Board, and David Krech, who had experience in many war research agencies. To secure Daniel Katz's help with the implementation of the SBS in Germany, Likert paid a personal visit to Brooklyn College's president in order to charm Katz away from his commitments as a department chair. Interviewing staffs were recruited from fields other than social psychology because of their knowledge of German culture and facility with the German language. For this purpose, Otto Klineberg and Katz recruited W. H. Auden, the English author (see Likert, 1981), and George Vetter and Clarence Leuba, both of whom had taken doctorates under Floyd Allport. Similarly, the survey of postwar Japan utilized Japanese Americans familiar with cultural and linguistic issues (Hyman, 1991).