Reviving the citizen-soldier

Public Interest, Spring, 2002 by Charles Moskos

IF there was any good that came of the terrible events of September 11, 2001, it was the apparent awakening of a long dormant American patriotism. Everyday observations as well as media coverage recorded abundant signs of national unity. Never in anyone's memory had so many American flags been displayed. Of particular note was the patriotic upsurge among the young. The press reported an increase in the number of people seeking to enter the armed forces, and recruiting offices, it was claimed, were deluged with inquiries.

But truth to tell, there was no increase in recruiting in the days and weeks following the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. And there were also indications that less had changed than met the eye. A poll of Harvard students released a few weeks after the attack revealed that only 32 percent of campus Democrats, 41 percent of independents, and 56 percent of Republicans would be willing to serve in the military if called upon. Despite all the flag waving, it seems likely that recruitment will remain a problem for America's all-volunteer force (AVF), and that privileged young Americans will continue to shun military service.

According to surveys between 1980 and 2000, the number of young Americans saying they definitely would not volunteer for military service increased from 40 to 64 percent. Recruitment problems, however, were alleviated by the lower recruitment objectives resulting from the drawdown in military force levels following the end of the Gold War. At the end of this drawdown in the late 1990s, recruitment shortfalls began appearing in all the services (with the exception of the Marine Corps) in the late 1990s. In fiscal year 2001, recruitment goals were met, but with much greater expenditure--about $11,000 per recruit compared with half that figure in the late 1980s. Even with these additional outlays, however, recruiters continue to be hard-pressed to meet goals, especially for reserve components.

How recent innovations in recruitment will fare is yet to be seen. Some appear promising. All the services are moving into on-line recruitment, complete with "chat rooms," to enlist new troops. In 2000, the Army introduced a program offering financial assistance to community-college students in advance of enlistment. But we should not lose sight of one of the verities of recruitment--the best recruiter is a credible veteran with a positive military experience.

Adding to recruitment woes is the surge in attrition since the advent of the AVF. In the peacetime draft era between the Korean and Vietnam Wars, approximately 10 percent of draftees failed to complete their two-year obligation. For enlistees who volunteered for the typical three-year term, the attrition rate was about 20 percent. Since the 1990s, over one-third of enlistees have not finished their first term. Statistical differences in race, gender, and education were significant. White women had an attrition rate of 55 percent, compared with 39 percent for black women. For males, the attrition rate was 26 percent for Hispanics, 33 percent for blacks, and 36 percent for whites. Those with a high school diploma had an attrition rate of 35 percent compared to 52 percent who entered without a high school diploma.

Even though recruitment goals for the active force were met in 2001, there were some disturbing signs of a drop in quality. The number of enlistees scoring in the top half of the armed-forces qualification tests has fallen by a third since the mid 1990s. Last year, the Army took in some 380 recruits with felony arrests, a number more than double that of 1998. The number of desertions is also climbing in recent years.

Recreating the citizen-soldier

The conventional wisdom within the Defense Department attributes recruitment and retention fluctuations to the economy. The conventional wisdom is wrong: The real problem is the high rate of college attendance. Today, some two-thirds of high school graduates go directly on to higher education. But military recruitment centers on the high school graduate--and, recently, those without diplomas as well. To focus on this population, rather than the expanding pool of college students and graduates, is self-limiting. The military needs to place greater attention on college recruitment, and must recognize that attracting college youth will require changes in the prevailing enlistment philosophy.

The biggest disincentive for college youth is the long enlistment. The armed forces try to get recruits to sign on for three, four, or more years by emphasizing such inducements as high pay and job training. For college youth, this is a nonstarter. Rather than stress military career opportunities, recruitment appeals must reinvigorate the ideal of the citizen-soldier. But more than the message must change.

The Defense Department spent $270,000,000 on recruitment advertising in 2001. To the consternation of many, the Army recently adopted a new recruiting slogan: "An Army of One." The hullabaloo over recruitment slogans may be overdone. In a survey of UCLA students I conducted last spring, three-quarters said they had not even heard of the slogan! Of those who had, over 90 percent said it would not affect their inclinations one way or the other. (Of the small number for whom the slogan had any effect, more said that it would make them less rather than more likely to join.) The extent to which the impact of such advertisements has been exaggerated was vividly brought to my attention when I addressed a large conference of Army recruiters in 1996. I asked them if they would prefer to have their advertisement budget tripled or have Chelsea Clinton join the Army. They unanimously raised their hands for the Chelsea option.