School choice schism

Public Interest, Spring, 2002 by Myron Lieberman

To the contrary, Merrifield argues that the conditions of these experiments make their success highly unlikely. He doubts that a typically small school-choice program that places severe restrictions on the freedom of buyers and sellers, and is at once subject to intense union opposition and vulnerable to termination by the legislature, can bring about significant educational improvement. Nevertheless, this fact does not weaken the case for a competitive education industry--these small programs have little if anything to do with a market system of education. While the school-choice projects Moe praises so highly may help a small number of students escape from poor public schools, they cannot be considered an adequate test of a free-market approach to education.

Instead, Merrifield relies on the broad success of free markets to defend his thesis. Experience in a variety of industries supports the principle that competition results in better service with lower costs than government-operated monopolies. Merrifield argues that the burden of proof in the voucher debate lies not on the free-market supporters of choice but on voucher opponents, who must explain why education should be an exception to the general rule.

Merrifield rejects the incrementalist strategy favored by Moe in which vouchers catch on in one community after another. Moe suggests that if school choice is promoted in a large number of communities, its supporters will no doubt win some of the battles. As communities become familiar with a voucher system, the idea of school choice will gain support. In contrast, Merrifield contends that highly restrictive school-choice plans will not bring about improvement in educational achievement or cost effectiveness. And because the public does not distinguish between school-choice plans, the free-market version of school choice will suffer from the intellectual fuzziness and poor track record of the restriction-laden plans.

In my opinion, the gradualist approach advocated by Moe is unlikely to maintain momentum. A major weakness of political coalitions is that they tend to fracture after one of the members gets what it wants: The satisfied group then often makes no effort to help the other members achieve the coalition's objectives. Moe provides a telling example of this dynamic in the case of Polly Williams, a leader of the school-choice movement in Milwaukee who supports vouchers for inner-city black pupils but opposes them for other students. Perhaps such leaders would rethink their opposition to universal vouchers if, in order to secure vouchers for their constituents, they were required to support the same for others.

While Merrifield wants vouchers with a minimum of regulation, Moe regards this as a losing strategy and seeks more closely monitored and narrowly tailored voucher projects. The underlying question is: What specific regulations would a voucher coalition accept? There is no way to answer this question, unless the leaders of a potential voucher coalition meet face-to-face in order to formulate positions that will be acceptable to all. Until such meetings are held by those who can deliver money and manpower, we cannot foresee what key positions will maintain a successful coalition. The voucher movement needs the kind of internal criticism that Moe and Merrifield provide, but it also needs a coalition that can successfully negotiate their differences.