Political Judaism and the post-Zionist era

Judaism, Spring, 1998 by Kevin Avruch

This, indeed, is the crux of the matter. For the messianic nationalists of Gush Emunim, the existential state of Israel is the precursor in potentia of the holy Kingdom of Israel. The state as it exists presently is, to be sure, imperfect and not whole, just as the Land was, before its conquest in 1967. But the mere fact of its existence against such great odds and in the face of so much hostility, is proof of its divine endorsement. Therefore the messianic nationalists invest the state with great legitimacy. This compares pointedly with the haredim, for whom Israel is wholly illegitimate, and the Agudah, for whom the legitimacy of Israel is no greater (in theory) than the legitimacy of Spain or Portugal: another (secular) state in a world system of states. The great legitimacy with which Israel is invested by the messianic nationalists has made the Gush Emunim appear at times extremely respectful of the state, its agents, and institutions - especially the Israel Defense Forces. Yet this is misleading, for the legitimacy they accord the state is also a contingent-legitimacy: dependent on the agents and institutions of the state adhering to the redemptive program, as understood by the messianists. But the state and its agents have not followed the redemptive program. There is a long list of "betrayals": From Camp David (under Begin, yet!) and the withdrawal from Yamit, to the bitter criticism of the IDF's "reluctance" to put down the intifada even more forcefully and protect Jewish settlements and settlers, to the concessions of the Oslo accords and trading "land [the Land] for peace."

The legitimacy accorded the state and its institutions, as they really exist, is thus conditional on the state (and these institutions) conforming to the chiliastic expectations of the messianic nationalists. When the state appears to falter in its commitments, Gush Emunim asserts, then the citizenry itself is enjoined to enforce compliance to the commitments, even in the face of opposition by the state. Thus, illegalism and vigilantism; thus the makhteret (Jewish underground network), or the late Rabbi Kahane's Kach or, more recently, Eyal. And thus, the lethal labeling of Prime Minister Rabin as rodef and moser, the worst kind of traitor. When the resolve of the state appears to falter, individual citizen violence and vigilantism are seen to be neither criminal nor deviant, but are instead viewed as the necessary correctives to the larger and more pernicious "deviance" of the misguided state? Finally, whatever else this contingent legitimacy implies for the nature of the state, it does not imply a profound commitment to its democratic character. One Gush Emunim writer declared Israeli electoral, consensus democracy as invalid as the "hundred percent consensus that prevailed within the people of Israel when it danced around the golden calf."(20) In the Kingdom of Israel righteousness rules, not a simple majority.(21)

Israeli Judaism in Fragments

In 1979 I tried to understand the emergence of Gush Emunim in part as a revitalization movement, responding to the deepening dissatisfaction that Israelis felt toward their culture and polity. I saw Gush as reflecting the "traditionalization" of Israeli nationalism, a sort of unraveling of the modern and primordial elements of Zionist ideology, with the latter gaining ascendance.(22) More recently, Gideon Aran has invoked the notion of traditionalizing in more evocative terms. The raising of the Land over People and Torah brought secular Zionism, in his words, closer to Judaism: "In the land of the Bible, the Israelis have met the Israelites."(23) But which Judaism has been called forth in this transformation? Israeli Judaism, considered as a cultural system, emerges in the unique sociopolitical context of a Jewish state. It is being shaped by conflict over the ultimate definition and fate of that state, and, not a little less, by conflict over the definition of "Jewishness."