Perspectives on truthfulness in the Jewish tradition

Judaism, Summer, 1993 by Ari Zivotofsky

(1.) See, Bahya ibn Paquda, in Kad ha Kemah, Emunah [Faith]; Saadiah Gaon: "Divine wisdom has made it one of the first injunctions that we speak the truth and desist from lying" (Emunot Ve'Deot [Commands and Prohibitons], Ch. 2); Maimonides, in his Letter of Moral Instruction to his son: "A life of truth and justice should necessarily be more acceptable even if it might appear less profitable than one of falsehood..." In addition, numerous word plays on the letters of both emet (truth) and sheker (falsehood) serve as quick reminders of the importance of truth in daily life.

For example: 1) The Hebrew letters of sheker - shin, kaf, resh - are next to each other in the aleph-bet, since falsehood is easy to come by, while the letters of emet - alef, mem, tav - are as far as possible from each other, since truth is more difficult to come by. 2) If one deviates even a little from emet - truth, symbolized by removing the alef - a letter which has a numerical value of only one (gematria), what is left is met - death. 3) the letters of emet all have solid bases or two even legs, and, so too, truth itself is solid and can stand on its own. All the letters of sheker have rounded or uneven legs and, thus, falsehoods cannot stand on their own (Yalkut Shimoni, Genesis 3). (2.) Mark Dratch, "Nothing But the Truth," Judaism, 37:2 (Spring, 1988): 219. (3.) Ibid., p. 223. (4.) Cf. interpretations of Saadiah Gaon, Ibn Ezra, Maimonides, Nahmanides, and Sefer Hahinukh. (5.) Cf. Sefer Mizvot HaGadol (Aseh 106), Sefer Mizvot Hakaton, and Sefer Yere'im. (6.) Murder, idolatry and illicit sexual relations. (7.) For a detailed discussion, see Mark Dratch, "His Money or Her Life? Heinz's Dilemma in Jewish Law," The Journal of Halacha and Contemporary Society, XX (Fall 1990). (8.) Ba'al Haturim, Perush Ha'Arukh on the Pentateuch. (9.) It is possible that Samuel did really offer a sacrifice, and thus, when he told the people that he had come to sacrifice, he was not lying, but simply omitting the fact that he also came to anoint a new king. This type of "lie" is "the truth, but not the whole truth." (10.) Written by Bahya ibn Paquda (11th century, Muslim Spain), Treatise on Faith, chap. 4. This seems to be supported by the Talmud in Pesahim 8b and Yoma 11a. (11.) Abarbanel (16th century) rejects both the idea of Samuel being afraid, and of God suggesting a lie. Rather, he understands that Samuel had no desire to go and anoint someone to replace Saul, and this was his way of trying to put if off (similar to Moses saying, "But they will not believe me" in Ex.4:1). For this reason, God placates him, as if to say: "If that is your problem, then take a heifer, etc." (12.) In Yevamot 65b, Rav Natan understood Samuel's lie as being in the name of peace, axid from there he derived a general imperative to lie to preserve peace, as discussed below. (13.) The first two on Genesis 27:19, and Ralbag in II Kings. (14.) I f absolute candor would in fact hasten the patient's death, lack of truthfulness is not only permissible, but mandatory. See Rabbi Bezalel Stern, Teshuvot be'Zayl ha-Homah II, no. 55; Shearim ha-Mezuyim be-Halakhah 191:2; and J. David Bleich, Judaism and Healing, 27-33. (15.) Mo|ed Katan 26b. This is quoted as the halakah in Yoreh Deah (Y.D.)337:1 and Rambam, Laws of Mourning, Chap. 8. The Beit Hillel on the Shulhan Arukh, and the Arukh HaShu-Uhan both extend this law to not even informing a patient of a parent's death. This halakhah is an example of not being required to tell everything. They do not discuss how to respond if explicitly asked by the patient. However, based on Y.D. 402:12, where the halakhah is stated that, with regards to a healthy person, one should not lie to them regarding the death of a relative (though one may answer ambiguously), it seems to me that with regards to a sick individual one may lie outright. (16.) Ta'anit 18b. (17.) A similar statement is found in Vayikra Rabbah 9:9. See also Yerushalmi, Peah 1:1 and Ukzin 3:12 on this verse and tlie value of peace. (18.) On Yevamot 65b. (19.) Ramban (on Genesis 45:27) and Rashi (on Genesis 50:16) both say that Jacob was never told. However, this contradicts a Rashi on Genesis 49:6, where Rashi indicates that Jacob did know of the brothers' deeds. (20.) Based on Genesis Rabbah 100:9, Vayikra Rabbah 9:9 and Yevamot 65b. (21.) Baba Mezia 87a; also in Genesis Rabbah 48:18 and Vayikra Rabbah 9:9. (22.) Nobody seems to suggest that God could have simply not repeated to Abraham anything that Sarah had said, and thus obviated the need to "lie." (23.) See also Koheleth Rabbah 5:6 and Yalkut Shimoni on Parshat Naso. Vayikra Rabbah 9:9 points out a similar modification for the sake of peace between husband and wife in judges 13:7. (24.) See also Yalkut Shimoni on Hukat. (25.) Other examples of where there is an imperative to tell the whole truth rather than remain silent, as a witness is obligated to do, are: 1) If a murderer who went into exile in a city of refuge, and the people of the city wished to honor him, he should say to them, "I am a murderer" (Makkot 12b). 2) A person should not hide a blemish within his family if he is marrying off his child, if it is such that the person could later claim he had a false impression when he accepted (Mekah T'us) (Sefer Hssidim 507). 3) Said Abaya: A disciple of a Sage has to make himself known. How so? A man who knew one tractate, [who] went to a place [where] they wish to pay him honor as if he knew two tractates, has to tell them, "I know only one tractate" Yerushalmi, Makkot 2:6). (26.) Yalkut Shimoni, Gen. 29:12, sect. 125, Bava Batra 123a, Meg. 13b. (27.) Norman Frimer, "A Midrash on Morality, or When is a Lie Permissible," Tradition, 13:4 and 14:1 (Spring-Summer 1973): 25-26. (28.) Gen. 31:6-7, 31:36-40, 31:42. (29.) Yoreh De'ah 232:14. (30.) Tosafot (Hullin 95b, s.v. ke'Eliezer) says that there was no switching of order. The way Eliezer told it was exactly the way it was. Accordingly, the first story is different than Eliezer's retelling of it, because "there is no order in the Torah." (31.) Telling her that her husband had sent them for the purses, and giving her, as their proof [having seen lentils on the innkeeper's moustache], the fact that lentils had been the last meal in her house (Soncino Talmud). (32.) Though the halizah was valid, Abaye held that the condition must be complied with. (33.) Hoshen Mishpat, 333:5. A similar type of halakhah, relating to illegitimate tax collectors, is found in Nedarim 62b and cited in Yoreh Deah 157:3. (34.) The word used in the text is Puria. Both Rashi and Tosafot understood it to mean bed. However, Tosafot argues that no one would ask such a question, and it is, instead, referring to one who is trying to conceal a nocturnal emission. Maharsha disagrees with this translation and says, instead, that it is referring to Purim, i.e., if someone asks if you are drunk, you are permitted to lie and say "yes" even when still sober, because one is obligated to drink a lot on Purim. (35.) A lie for the sake of dignity is not always permitted. The Shulhan Arukh (Yoreh Deah 344:1) rules that, although it is important to give a deceased a eulogy, one should not mention things that are not true. Rather, the person's good attributes should be mentioned and then added to a little. On this last comment, the Taz explains that what is referred to is not a lie, but an extension of his known actions which we assume to be true as well. Cf. the Shulhan Arukh 334:5, and Shakh, s.k.4. (36.) See also, tractate Kallah, Rabbati, Chap. 6. (37.) The debate is, in fact, decided in favor of Beit Hillel in Even Ha'ezer 65:1. (38.) See section on "Peace." See also, Yisrael Meir Low, "Truth and Lack of Truth - For the Sake of Peace" (Hebrew), Torah Shebe'al Peh Journal, 1980: 88-100. (39.) See, e.g., Nedarim 28a. (40.) Even Ha'ezer 65:1. (41.) On this text in Ketubot. (42.) On Ketubot 16b. (43.) See section on "Humility, Modesty and Hospitality." (44.) See section on "Peace." (45.) It is actually quite similar to the lie that Sarah told when confronted about her laughter upon hearing that they would have a child. She lied (though she did not admit it) because she assumed it would contribute to marital harmony, and she believed that she could get away with it because she assumed Abraham did not know better. (46.) He did this in order to save the real offender from humiliation. (47.) Thus attaching the blame to himself. (48.) Re: lies taking other than a verbal form, see Responsa Ziz Eliezer, vol. 15:12, where he says unequivocally that a written lie is just as prohibited as a verbal lie. A source possibly indicating that a non-verbal lie is better than an explicit one, is provided by Ralbag on the Samuel story (I Samuel 16). Ralbag there seems to be of the opinion that God was advocating a lie, although possibly a non-verbal one. (49.) For a similar, more recent, real life story regarding A. Wilheim Roentgen (1845-1923, discoverer of X-rays, and Nobel Laureate in Physics, 1901), see Vivian Grey, Roentgen's Revolution: The Discovery of the X-ray (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1973), pp. 5-6. Roentgen's punishment for lying to protect another, however, turned out to be permanent expulsion from the school rather than a compliment from Rabban Gamliel. (50.) See Y.D. 402:12 for a practical example of this. (51.) See section above on Financial Loss." (52.) The Ohr Hahayim, on the other hand, maintaining his policy of not admitting to lies by the forefathers, explains that Jacob was saying that, since he had purchased the rights of the firstborn from Esau, he had become Esau in so far as firstborn issues are concerned. Thus, his response of: "I am Esau your firstborn," was indeed true, as were all further statements. (53.) Rashi similarly explains Jacob's answer in the continuation of the dialogue in Genesis 27:24. Isaac asked "Are you my son Esau?" and Jacob simply said "I am," which could be variously interpreted, rather than saying, "I am Esau." Cf. n. 54. (54.) See Siftei Hakhamim, who is troubled with even this repunctuation. At the very least, this statement seems to violate the law against "placing a stumbling block before the blind," both figuratively and literally. And, irrespective of how Jacob's statement is interpreted, Isaac passed judgement on it when he said to Esau: "Your brother came with guile and took away your blessing" (Genesis 27:35). (55.) Ibn Ezra, on the other hand, does not see Abraham's explanation here as a justification, but rather as an effort to placate Avimelekh. According to Ibn Ezra, Abraham was, in fact, lying, but was permitted to do so in a time of need. See Ibn Ezra on Gen. 27:19. Sforno sees Abraham's justification in yet a different light. Abraham left out half the truth, but not with respect to the brother-sister relationship; rather, he simply neglected to mention that they were also husband and wife. Radak justifies this lie, as he does Jacob's lie in Gen. 27:18-19, by saying that it is not a true lie if it has a valid reason. Jacob knew he deserved the blessing (his mother, who knew it through prophecy, told him so), so it was permitted to lie. (56.) See section on Pikuah Nefesh. (57.) An application of this principle is found in a story regarding Rav Zalman, the brother of the Vilna Gaon mentioned in Torah Loda'as, vol.XVII, number 18. Rav Zalman Sorotzkin, in Oznayim LaTorah, finds a hint for the permissibility of the dual-meaning lie by the seemingly superfluous word, "d'var" ("word," as used in: "From the word of a lie you shall keep far"), in Exodus 23:7. (58.) See Eruvin 5 la, and Pesahim 112a; ascribing a saying to an important person, to ensure acceptance of the halakhah, is cited with approval in Magen Abraham, Orah Hayim 156. An additional, less obvious, example is found in Pesahim 27a. There, it is reported that Samuel reversed the names in a debate in order that the law should be established the way he thought it should be. (59.) Seder Eliyahu Rabba of Tanna d'Vei Eliyahu (3rd?-10th centuries?), 4:1. (60.) Tanna d'Vei Eliyahu speaks in the first person, as if Elijah the prophet was the speaker. (61.) And I require heat. (Soncino Talmud) (62.) Additional occurrences of lies, or the appearance thereof, in the Bible which were not discussed herein, include, e.g., Gen. 21:3,6; Gen. 22:5; Gen. 31:35 (possible lie); Gen. 34:13; Gen. 37:32; I Sam. 12:3,6; I Kings 22:15; Daniel 4:16 (according to Ibn Ezra). See also Oznayim LaTorah on 1 Kings 18 (re the haftorah to KiTissa). (63.) Both of whom deal with the problem of lying to dying patients. (64.) Who deals with the problem of lying in the presentation of medical data. (65.) They were presented with the problem of Jews trying to get into Israel in the early 1930s. The British would give a certain number of permits to the Jews of each country. The question posed concerned the Jews of one country lying and claiming to be from another country which had extra permits. Rav Sonnenfeld, the head of the Eydah Haredah, ruled that it was not permitted to lie in such a circumstance. However, once near the shores of Israel, the Jews would throw their passports overboard and claim to be natives of Israel. Rav Sonnenfeld said that this was permitted, and the "Ragetchaver Rebbe" said that this claim could even be sworn to in court, based on the verse, "But of Zion it shall be said, |This and that man were born in her'" (Psalms 87:5). (66.) Jack S. Cohen, "Halachic Parameters of Truth," Tradition, 16:3 (Spring, 1977):83-97; Mark Dratch, "Nothing but the Truth," Judaism, 37:2 (Spring, 1988):218-228; Gary J. Lavit, "Truth-telling to Patients with Terminal Diagnoses," The Journal of Halacha and Contemporayy Society, No. 15 (Spring, 1988):94-124. (67.) Mark Twain, Pudd'nhead Wilson's New Calendar, quoted in Lying: A Critical Analysis, by Warren Shibles (The Language Press, 1985).