Anti-Semitic policy in Albert Speer's plans for the rebuilding of Berlin

33. Minutes of the meeting of Nov. 12, 1938, in documents from the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, PS.1816, 41ff. The Nuremberg documents (assembled by the prosecution, later microfilmed for the U.S. National Archives, and then made available to other libraries) are referred to by their reel number.

34. BA, R2/9181, 18-21.

35. RGBl., 1, Apr. 30, 1939, 864-65.

36. Schmidt, 182.

37. BA Potsdam, 46.06 GBI/157, 145.

38. See the memorandum of Sept. 29, 1940, in ibid., 46.06 GBI/78, 88: "Mit dieser Notwendigkeit kann unter Umstanden die ganze Raumung mit begrundet werden!" For Speer's claims of authorship of the policy, see ibid., 46.06 GBI/24, 57. Hitler's decision here, as in other aspects of the development of anti-Semitic policy, appears to be an approval of his subordinate's proposals, rather than directly initiated by himself. For a more detailed analysis of Hitler's role in the approval of policies against the Jews, see Browning.

39. BA, R120/1975, 144-48.

40. Ibid., 145: "Ist die SS in der Lage, 100 Wohnungen innerhalb 14 Tage zu raumen? Insgesamt mussen bis zum 28.2.d.J. ca. 250 Judenwohnungen wiedervermietet und sodann geraumt werden. Die SS erhalt fur die Raumung der betreffenden Judenwohnungen eine Liste."

41. Ibid., 147: "Juden sollen nur noch in Judenhausern untergebracht werden. Zu diesem Zweck erhalt die SS von der Wohnungs-Abt. eine entsprechende Liste."

42. RGBl., 1, Apr. 28, 1941, 219-20. On Speer's distortion of the archival version of the GBI journal concerning the extent of his involvement with anti-Semitic housing policy, see, e.g., Schmidt, 1-22, 183. Population statistics for this period are reprinted in Alexander (as in n. 16), 311. For a brief overview of the attack on Jewish property rights and the partial centralization of Jewish urban populations in 1939-42, see Barkai, 167-74.

43. See, e.g., the letter of May 2, 1941, in BA, R2/19435, from the Ministry of Labor to the Ministry of Finance concerning the dual needs of the population under siege on the one hand, and, on the other, of state architectural policy. On Hitler's management of his subordinates in formulating anti-Semitic policy leading to the death camps, see C. Browning, "Nazi Resettlement Policy and the Search for a Solution to the Jewish Question, 1939-1941" (1986), in The Path to Genocide: Essays on Launching the Final Solution, Cambridge, 1992, 3-27.

44. BA Potsdam, 46.06 GBI/24, 57. Speer's antipathy to Bormann has been well documented including his own discussion of his competitor in Speer, 87-93, 120-28, 252-61.

45. Schmidt, 187-88.

46. For a full analysis of the connection of SS concentration camps to state architectural policy, see Jaskot (as in n. 14). See also F. Pingel, Haftlinge unter SS-Herrschaft: Widerstand, Selbstbehauptung und Vernichtung im Konzentrationslager, Hamburg, 1978, 78-80; and T. Siegert, "Das Konzentrationslager Flossenburg," in Bayern in der NS Zeit, ed. M. Broszat and E. Frohlich, II, Munich, 1979, 441-44, 489-92.

47. Speer, 33.

48. See, e.g., T. Childers and J. Caplan, eds., Reevaluating the Third Reich, New York, 1993, for essays that present an excellent summary of many of the key issues, without, however, including any exploration of culture. For two notable exceptions, see A. Steinweis, Art, Ideology, and Economics in Nazi Germany: The Reich Chambers of Music, Theater and the Visual Arts, Chapel Hill, N.C., 1993; and Petropoulos (as in n. 27).