US politicians must solve rail funding problem - High Speed: United States

International Railway Journal, Oct, 2002 by Donald M Itzkoff

The future prospects for high-speed rail in the United States are inextricably linked to the future of Amtrak. Indeed, Amtrak is the only organisation to make concrete progress with high-speed, having introduced Acela Express on the Northeast Corridor. If politicians can be persuaded to come up with a long-term funding solution for long-distance passenger rail, this will improve the prospects for high-speed rail.

AS THIS past summer began, Amtrak turned "hot" in Washington DC once again, mirroring outside temperatures of more than 35[degrees]C. But a threatened late-June 2002 shutdown came and went with Amtrak still running. On June 25, the US secretary of transportation, Mr Norman Mineta, aptly summarised the political dynamics prevailing: "No one wants to see Amtrak die."

For more than a generation since Amtrak's formation in 1971 the on-again, off-again debate over its future has reliably generated more heat than light. The federal government ultimately kept Amtrak going with a temporary fix, first through a special loan guarantee from the Department of Transportation (DOT) and subsequently with an additional cash infusion through a supplemental Congressional spending bill. But with only a short-term solution enacted, and a major $US 200 billion-plus surface transportation and highway funding bill to be considered in 2003, the next Congress could determine the future of intercity and high-speed rail in the United States.

The Florida High Speed Rail Authority has prepared a draft request for proposals (RFP) for a state high-speed rail system to implement the constitutional amendment adopted by Florida voters in 2000 requiring construction of such a system. Discussions with prospective bidders are underway, with the expectation that the final RFP will be issued shortly with responses due early next year.

The Californian state legislative has approved a bond measure worth nearly $US 10 billion for high-speed and regional rail projects which could be considered by voters next year. However, every significant US high-speed project now envisaged is still likely to require substantial federal participation. So Washington's role is crucial.

This summer's confrontation over Amtrak provides a preview of the debate to unfold in 2003, when Congress will consider the future of Amtrak and high-speed rail at the same time as a mammoth highway and transit authorisation which occurs every six years. There are three dynamics to watch.

After winning the presidency in 2000, it took time for the new Bush Administration DOT team to complete the confirmation process and begin retooling transport policy. But soon after his arrival, Mineta refrained the debate and asked: "How can we make intercity rail successful?" This replaced the previous administration's emphasis on "How can we make Amtrak successful?" This difference led DOT to embrace the Amtrak Reform Council's recommendations issued in February 2002, and helped set up a congressional showdown when Amtrak's finances came up short.

Conversely, Democratic assumption of control of the Senate in 2001 fostered a pro-Amtrak agenda. Otherwise, Senator John McCain, as chair of the Commerce Committee, would have promoted a vastly different vision for rail than Senator Ernest Hollings, chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee, and Senator Murray, chair of the Transportation Appropriations Subcommittee, would never have been able to push a $US 1.2 billion appropriation for Amtrak for fiscal 2003 through the Appropriations Committee.

More than any other factor, the congressional elections this autumn will determine the future for Amtrak and high-speed rail as part of the highway and transit reauthorisation in 2003.

US high-speed rail advocates have pushed for substantial federal investment for two decades without much success. Only now, and especially in the wake of last year's September 11 tragedy, has momentum developed in Washington to support balanced transport spending including rail.

But that did not lead to legislative success in 2002.

The reason is that it is always harder in the US legislative process to approve a bill than oppose it. The Senate generally requires 60 votes out of 100 to cut off debate and take up controversial legislation, and Senate rules give wide latitude to individual members to delay bills they disagree with. So even though a $US 12 billion high-speed investment proposal garnered 56 co-sponsors, a clear majority, with just two months left to go in the session, the Senate still had not considered the bill on the floor. In addition, tight majority control of the House of Representatives process dictates which bills are considered and when.

Pushing past this legislative inertia requires extraordinary force or a catalysing event. Airlines received this boost in the wake of September 11 when they gained a $US 15 billion bailout in a matter of days. Had it progressed, last summer's Amtrak crisis could have developed into a similar triggering event. Prospects for substantial legislative action in 2003 depend largely on rekindling the same sense of urgency about passenger rail seen briefly last summer.