Initiatives boost metro ridership and revenue: SkyTrain, as one of the first commercially-built and operated metros in Asia, was forced to adapt to a radically different economic climate when it opened for business compared with its original business case. Many of the lessons learned can be applied to other metros

International Railway Journal, June, 2005 by Paul Anderson

THERE is no doubt that it is more difficult to build a metro today than it used to be. The public is involved much more than in the past, and environmental issues are very important. The complex issue of planning involves the integration of transport and town planning, alignment and system design, commercial judgement, community interests, non-governmental organisations, political agendas, guesswork and some luck.

The new metro lines completed in the past five to 10 years in Bangkok, Hong Kong, Singapore, Taipei, and Kuala Lumpur have finished on schedule and within budget, but achieved less than half the forecast ridership. They have been government-financed or guaranteed with the exception of SkyTrain in Bangkok, and Star and Putra in Kuala Lumpur.

Developed countries like Japan, Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Taiwan now have excellent metro networks. But developing countries with large populations, notably China, India, Indonesia, Philippines, and Thailand, are having more difficulty in developing their infrastructure. So there is great opportunity if the right solution can be found.

The road traffic situation in countries such as India, Thailand and China is degrading rapidly. People often spend up to 4 hours a day in cars or buses. Pollution levels are high, leading to related illnesses. Expensive imported fuel is wasted unnecessarily. The impact on global warming and climate change is unknown.

At the moment, metro projects are competing for funding and overseas borrowing with a long line of essential projects. These countries would be able to develop their mass transit systems more quickly if they made a number of key changes. Capital costs must be reduced, which means building lines above ground rather than underground. This would suit many Asian cities that are built on river deltas and are therefore prone to flooding and have poor ground conditions. Project planning and implementation cycles need to take less time. Concession models must be attractive to private sector participation. Property and advertising revenues should be included in the business model to improve the return on investment. Farebox revenue alone is not attractive enough.

The SkyTrain project to build a two-line 24km elevated metro in Bangkok was launched in 1992. At that time there were no dark clouds on the horizon regarding the Thai economy. The project was to be financed entirely by the private sector. A concession was awarded to a property developer.

In 1997, Thailand plunged into an economic crisis. By the time SkyTrain opened in December 1999, about 2 million people had moved out of Bangkok and returned to the countryside because of the recession. SkyTrain was only generating abut $US 40 million a year in revenue, which was $US 60 million below forecast. The ability to service loans became a problem and there were no government guarantees.

It would be better for government to fund the civil works, which represents about 50% of the capital costs, and for the concessionaire to pay for the electro-mechanical part of the project. It would be more prudent to share more of the risk with the government.

There are a number of ways to reduce capital and operating costs. Trains are a cost driver and fleets are often larger than necessary because:

* the patronage forecast was too high

* managers fear that if they don't get the trains now the government may not allocate funds in the future

* concerns exist over compatibility if additional cars are purchased later

* we always buy six, eight or 12-car trains

* conservative thinking dominates service spares and maintenance cycles

* optimisation of train performance parameters; acceleration, braking, station spacing, and terminus design is poor

* rolling stock suppliers are inflexible--our trains only come in three-car units, and

* trains are often ordered for the first 10 or 15 years of operation rather than a shorter period.

Table 1 shows the savings that could be achieved on a project if the number of cars to be ordered could be reduced by 15.

The track layout at each end of a line is a bottleneck in most metros. It controls the ultimate through-put of the line. By optimising the layout of the terminus it is possible to reduce the number of trains required to operate the peak-hour service.

There are two main types of terminus design. The so-called in-front-of-terminus design, whereby a cross-over is installed on the approach to the final station, avoids the need for turn-back tracks, and will save one train. However, this requires a centre platform which may not be possible in all cases. Table 2 shows the potential saving of implementing an in-front-of-terminus design at both ends of the line.

An after-the-terminus design has the benefit of providing a place to store a defective train or a train taken out after the peak hour. It may also serve as a connection to the depot. However, it requires an additional train, and 300 to 400m of track to turn the train around.

SkyTrain originally forecast ridership at 600,000 passengers a day. This was later revised down to 400,000. But even this proved too optimistic as SkyTrain was only carrying 125,000 passengers/day when it opened. We developed a marketing strategy to increase traffic, which grew by 25% in the first year. SkyTrain is now carrying almost 400,000 passengers a day and traffic is growing at 14%.