CTC Notes

Engineer: The Professional Bulletin for Army Engineers, May, 2001 by Lieutenant Colonel Scott Bickell

Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) 2000 BCTP Perceptions for Mobility/Survivability

Each year, the BCTP consolidates significant lessons learned as a result of Warfighter exercises. Developed for each Battlefield Operating System (BOS), these lessons learned become BCTP Perceptions. Two of three BCTP Perceptions for 2000 for the mobility/survivability (M/S) BOS-Commanders and staffs do not take adequate actions to counteract enemy countermobility efforts and Commanders do not maximize countermobility capabilities or effects--are carryovers from the 1999 BCTP Perceptions (see the November 1999 issue of Engineer). The third BCTP Perception focuses on deliberate river-crossing operations. In several Warfighter exercises, commanders and staffs have struggled with planning and executing deliberate river-crossing operations. It is apparent that these operations have become a lost art. The following perceptions address the problems that we have identified during Warfighter exercises and lists some tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP).

Perception: Commanders and staffs do not plan or synchronize river-crossing operations.

Discussion: Commanders and staffs at the corps and division levels struggle with planning and executing deliberate river-crossing operations. This perception has three components:

* Staffs do not identify, and units do not set, the conditions to conduct river-crossing operations. There is no single doctrinal source that clearly articulates all conditions units must meet to conduct a river crossing. Typically, staffs will state the conditions that must be met, but they do not conduct a cross-BOS analysis of these conditions and do not develop plans that allow the necessary conditions to be met. Also, staffs do not clearly identify GO/NO-GO criteria for the river crossing based on meeting the conditions, nor do they develop contingencies that address the failure to set the conditions. Typically, a division will identify a set of conditions that must be met to conduct a successful river crossing. Often, subordinate brigades will identify a set of conditions to be met for the, crossing, but these conditions are not linked to the division's conditions. Seldom is the status of these conditions briefed at battle-update briefs (BUBs).

* Commanders and primary staff officers tend to view river crossings as an engineer operation instead of a complex combined-arms operation. Units seldom plan a river-crossing operation as a combined-arms operation using all of the available staff expertise. Past Warfighter exercises have shown that engineers will have the "rose pinned on them" for developing the corps or division river-crossing plan. The staff engineer produces the written river-crossing plan and includes it as an appendix to the engineer annex. Cross-BOS analysis is seldom conducted, and details of the river crossing are not nested in the base order. Also, brigade-level staffs fail to conduct detailed river-crossing planning based on the division's plan and fail to adjust these plans based on current enemy and friendly situations.

* Units assign river-crossing operations to subordinate units and do not provide the required support. Corps and divisions typically task subordinate units to conduct river-crossing operations without giving them sufficient resources and support. Corps must allocate sufficient resources to crossing divisions. (Not every division needs to conduct an opposed river crossing; therefore, not every division needs river-crossing assets.) Divisions, like corps, must allocate sufficient resources and support to crossing brigades. Typically, divisions will allocate assets down to the crossing brigades. What is supposed to be a division deliberate crossing turns into separate brigade crossings that are not synchronized with the division's plan. Corps and divisions have a planning and resourcing responsibility for river-crossing operations. For instance, corps will develop the deception plan and resource this plan for a division's deliberate river crossing. Corps and divisions must also assist in setting the conditions f or subordinate units' river-crossing operations. An example of this would be the corps providing additional artillery and aviation assets to conduct deep attacks against enemy artillery which could influence the crossing sites.

TTP:

* Units conducting a deliberate river-crossing operation must conduct a cross-B OS analysis of conditions to be met and must clearly identify GO/NO-GO criteria for the operation based on those conditions. The stated conditions should be nested in the corps/division base operations order, and the status of these conditions should be briefed at BUBs.

* Units must develop and execute detailed, synchronized plans that allow the necessary conditions to be met and develop contingencies that address the failure to set those conditions. Also, conditions set by subordinate units must be nested with those set by the higher headquarters.

* River crossings are complex combined-arms operations. Engineers provide the means and support to corps and division river crossings, but they should not develop the entire river-crossing plan. BOS integration and synchronization are key to planning and executing successful river-crossing operations. Units must plan river-crossing operations as a combined-arms operation. Maneuver planners at the division level must take the lead on developing the deliberate river-crossing plan.