ORM CORNER: More Than Just Crew Rest - Brief Article

Approach,  Dec, 2000  by David Levenson

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Every crew brief covers operational risk management (ORM), but the ORM part often lacks depth. Mission commanders and flight leads simply ask if everyone has had enough crew rest or sleep. ORM is much more than that.

On one particular flight, the entire crew had gotten plenty of sleep, but ORM still played a significant role in averting a mishap over the skies of Macedonia. I was ECMO 1 in an EA-6B during a night-strike mission over southern Kosovo. After the strike, we headed toward our tanker. The communications with AWACs were unusually weak and full of static. There was a layer of broken clouds just below the tanker altitude. Without air-to-air radar or night-vision devices, finding the tanker was becoming next to impossible. With our fuel getting close to bingo, we finally found the tanker and commenced the join-up on the left, which is the standard side for the Navy, but not standard for the Air Force.

We hadn't briefed which side of the tanker we would join on--mission planning overshadowed that type of detail. Once joined, we realized that two British Tornados were already on the tanker, one taking fuel and the other on the right side. After they finished, I saw Dash 2 disconnect and apparently clear off below us. As we slid back, anticipating getting in the basket, a bright flash filled our cockpit accompanied by severe buffet. The Tornados had tapped burner right in front of us, instead of exiting down and aft. They turned off their lights and went left into us. My pilot dumped the nose and successfully avoided them. We climbed back to the tanker, got our gas, covered another strike, and returned to Aviano.

Once on deck, I told the operations officer what had happened. Tanking briefs started getting a lot more attention. In fact, in the 45 days we were over the skies of Bosnia, this near-midair was one of the most hazardous flight events I experienced.

This may seem like just another close call, but ORM could have easily lessened the severity of the problem or broken the chain of events leading to it. In most cases, you can easily cope with the risks of day-to-day flying. The next time you brief ORM, think of "Dumb, Different, or Directed." Each of these categories won't cover all risks that you may encounter, but they can highlight potential problems.

Some ORM concerns under "Dumb" are flying in terrible weather, descending below the briefed hard deck, or continuing a flight beyond calculated bingo. These things can usually be solved quickly in the cockpit. There are also not-so-obvious, dumb risks, and these might be the most important: poor mission planning, flying with people who have unresolved personal problems, or flying with outdated FLIP or charts. Unfortunately, these will not become apparent until too late.

"Different" covers those actions that vary from the normal activity. For example, flying into a new airfield or unfamiliar airspace. Air refueling at night is also a good example. Before our near collision with the Tornado, we should have identified the unusual procedures and briefed them. While not particularly dangerous, the items in "Different" can contribute greatly to causing a more dangerous situation.

Lastly, "Directed" activity covers those actions ordered by higher authority that may influence the aircrew's judgment. These actions are check-rides, functional check flights, cross-countries, or combat. The crew might be directly or indirectly pressured to complete the flight or check. Over Macedonia, our crew wanted to complete the air refueling, avoid a bingo divert into an unfamiliar airfield, and support the last of the night strikes. The internal drive to complete a mission, whether combat or peacetime, can cloud aircrew's judgment.

Identifying the possible hazards is a great first step, but it is just as important to identify control measures for these hazards and ways to lessen the effects. If the severity or probability is too great, complete avoidance is often the best solution. Usually, identifying the hazard and sticking to the planned mission is enough. Occasionally, you have to make slight changes in the plan. Remember, the goal of ORM is to lessen the known risks involved. It may be as simple as taking off earlier from a high-density-altitude airport when the temperatures are typically cooler.

ORM Corner is a bi-monthly department.

Please send your questions, comments or recommendations to Mr. John Mahoney, the ORM coordinator at the Naval Safety Center, or to Capt. Denis M. Faherty, Director, Operational Risk Management. Mr. Mahoney's address is: Code 08, Naval Safety Center, 375 A St., Norfolk, VA 23511-4399, or call (757) 444-3520, ext. 7310(DSN 564) E-mail: jmahoney@safetycenter.navy.mil

Write Capt. Faherty at OPNAV Code N-09K, 2000 Navy Pentagon, Rm 5E-816, Washington, D.C. 20350-2000, or call (703) 614-8430 (DSN 224). E-mail: faherty.denis@hq.navy.mil

Capt. Levenson, homebased with Det. 1, 366 FW, is flying with VAQ-134.

COPYRIGHT 2000 U.S. Naval Safety Center
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