Sauna in the gulf

Approach, Jan-Feb, 2004 by James C. Logsdon

As the safety officer, I had tasked many of the JOs to write Approach articles to share their learning experiences. After I returned from a "good deal" FCF, the JOs had returned the favor by tasking me (via the ready room white board) to write this article.

The Arabian Gulf becomes comfortable by early November. I was flying an FCF C in aircraft 300. The sky was clear and the typical Gulf haze was absent. The preflight, poststart checks and launch were uneventful. Immediately off the catapult, I noticed the electronic-control system (ECS) flow had increased in force and temperature. I continued the Case I departure, and checked the cabin-temperature set to full cold. I then selected ECS manual and saw another increase in flow. The air temperature was extremely hot--similar to jet exhaust on the flight deck. I reselected ECS to auto, and debated recovering immediately. I completed the cockpit-hot checklist to the step to secure the bleed air and eliminate the source of hot air. Considering the heat uncomfortable, but bearable for a 1 15 sortie, I chose to leave on the bleed air, and continue the FCF--I chose poorly.

On the climb-out, the cockpit was least uncomfortable when I ran the defog lever full forward. This setting directs the strong, hot airflow away from my torso, hands and arms, and toward my face and head (protected by the helmet, visor and mask). Selecting ECS to OFF/RAM and cabin pressure to RAM/DUMP did not eliminate the hot airflow, but did reduce it the most.

The FCF checks were uneventful and completed within 20 minutes after takeoff. I continued the cockpit-temperature-high checklist, which I had shelved earlier, and climbed toward the ship. I estimate the air pouring from the ECS ducts was at least 150 degrees (NATOPS states with ECS switch to manual, the air temperature from the ducts can reach 190 degrees). The cockpit was hot, and before I did anything else, the signal-data computer (SDC) failed. This failure eliminated aircraft-fuel-quantity indications and rendered inoperative the integrated fuel and engine indicator (IFEI), except for engine rpm and temperature. The multi-purpose-color display (MPCD) also failed, but I could get the horizontal-situation indicator (HSI) data on the digital-data (display) indicator (DDI).

I contacted a squadron representative and reported the SDC failure and the hot cockpit. He asked if I had tried ECS in manual. I replied, "Yes, but that gives me a strong, insanely hot airflow."

The rep missed the significance of my comment. With the rep's assistance, I completed the cockpit-temperature-hot checklist. The next step was to secure the engine-bleed air. I did as directed, and the rep arranged a pull-forward recovery. He was concerned about the lack of engine and fuel information available to me. With the bleed air secured, I noticed the hot air had stopped pouring into the cockpit. Soon, I would feel more uncomfortable; the airflow had caused my perspiration to evaporate, keeping me relatively cool. At least I was cooler than I soon would feel.

While I felt changes in cockpit airflow, I didn't realize I still had been breathing onboard-oxygen-generating-system (OBOGS) air for the last minute or so. I felt confused, and then felt my oxygen hose slightly collapse while I inhaled. It then struck me, I was at 17,000 feet with inoperative OBOGS. I shut off the OBOGS and initiated the emergency-oxygen source. The rep and I had missed the significance of securing the bleed air while above 10,000 feet. This obvious consequence is not mentioned in the NATOPS procedures in the PCL.

After I went on oxygen, I descended to 2,000 feet, and aligned myself for recovery. I removed my oxygen mask when below 10,000 feet, and left it off for the remainder of the flight. It took about 10 minutes for the ship to prepare a ready deck. Meanwhile, I had to dump fuel to reach my desired landing weight. But, without any fuel indications, I had to determine an alternative method to reach max trap. The solution was to dump fuel until the aircraft was at the appropriate airspeed for 34,000 pounds. Our concern was to make sure I didn't dump too much fuel. As I configured the aircraft for landing, I realized the cockpit, without airflow, was sweltering. I engaged radalt hold and automatic-throttle control (ATC), and then held the dump switch, while S-turning behind the ship at eight miles. I had to hold the dump switch because of the SDC failure.

As I adjusted gross weight, the LSOs called to ask about my malfunction. I told them of the SDC failure, and mentioned the cockpit was very hot. I was sweating profusely and watched my flight suit turn dark green. The rep, while monitoring tower, asked whether my situation was debilitating or just uncomfortable. I was very uncomfortable, but I had no idea what "debilitating" meant at that time. I still was functioning, so I replied, "Uncomfortable."

I finally reached 141 knots (the speed incorrectly calculated by the rep for on-speed was 142 knots--the actual value should have been 139 knots, as configured), and reported ready to come aboard. I didn't feel well. I aligned with the ILS azimuth, and pushed over to capture glide slope. I backed up myself on the appropriate altitudes during the approach, similar to a night approach. I checked the heads-up display (HUD) to see the DME, but when I saw 3.6, I thought the ILS must be inaccurate. I should've been level until 3 DME, yet I was on the glide slope--not realizing I tipped over at 2,000 feet vice 1,200 feet. I was confused. Since everything looked right on the approach, I discarded the information I couldn't process and continued.