Don't worry, that never will happen

Approach,  May-June, 2004  by Sean Maybee

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This story, like many aviation stories, could start, "It was just another normal day ...," but many days that start normally don't end up that way.

We were scheduled for a zero-dark-30 (middle-of-the-night) preflight and launch on a 10-hour grinder of a mission. Our mid-December flight over Afghanistan was in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. I was the officer in charge of the EP-3E detachment and the mission commander on this flight. I also would be certifying a newly arrived crew on the special instructions and procedures related to our mission. The arriving crew was very seasoned and had plenty of theater experience.

We were airborne at 0330 started our transit toward on-station, and completed routine checks and system run-ups. After 45 minutes, and while cruising at our max-range altitude of FL190, I got up to use the head and to grab a cup of coffee. I barely had made it to the back of the plane when I heard the sound no pilot likes to hear come over the PA, "EWAC [electronic warfare aircraft commander] to the flight station.

Having not achieved either of my goals, I hustled to the flight station to see the flight engineer (FE) pointing to a steadily dropping oil-quantity indicator for the No. 3 engine.

"Not a big deal," I thought, "we'll shut it down, go home, and I'll be in bed by 0600." I should have gone to the bathroom.

While strapping in, I called for the No. 3 emergency-shutdown handle, which the FE acknowledged, checked and pulled. The copilot, in the left seat, flew the plane while I strapped in, slid my seat forward, grabbed the checklist, and started to go over it.

EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN HANDLE.... PULL (FE) HRD (FIRE ONLY).... DISCHARGED (P, FE) CROSSFEED AND BOOST PUMPS.... CHECK (FE) PROPELLER.... FEATHERED (P, CP, FE) OIL TANK SHUTOFF VALVE CIRCUIT BREAKERS.... AS REQUIRED (P, FE)

The FE pulled the emergency-shutdown handle (the fire bottle was not required), the propeller feathered, and we reset the oil-tank shutoff-valve circuit breakers to prevent further oil leakage. Almost immediately, the No. 3 fire-warning light illuminated, and the loud, distinctive fire-warning horn sounded. We were surprised, since the engine already was shut down, and the propeller was feathered. We silenced the fire-warning horn and quickly revisited the checklist, hurrying to item No. 2:

HRD (FIRE ONLY).... DISCHARGED.

About this time, the events got interesting. To our even greater surprise and growing alarm, dispensing the fire bottle into the engine only extinguished the fire-warning light for about a second, which restarted the fire-warning horn. We continued the checklist.

ALTERNATIVE HRD (CONFIRMED) FIRE ONLY.... AS REQUIRED (P, FE)

I called aft for somebody to look at the No. 3 engine.

Soon, the very calm and reassuring voice of our off duty FE, who had more than 10,000 flight hours, said over the headset, "Yep, commander, we definitely have flames out here. Some are coming out the tailpipe, and a little is coming out the cowling."

"Well," I thought, "he doesn't seem too excited, so it must nut be that bad."

We continued with the checklist. The FE selected the alternate fire bottle and discharged it into the engine, but nothing happened. The fire bottle had no effect on the fire. I recalled glancing at the FE and the copilot, and, lot about half a heartbeat, we looked at each other with huge eyes and "What do we do now?" expressions.

Anticipating a bad button or circuitry, the FE immediately checked the circuit breakers. He then reached tip and punched the fire bottle-discharge button about 10 more times, while the words "You've got to be kidding!" escaped my mouth.

Until this point, the events were straightforward and our flight-station crew quickly went through the procedures and checklists and coordinated with the back-end crew. But, we now were faced with a serious emergency not covered by NATOPS. Although I never have flown a tactical jet, it's my understanding that, at the end of their engine-fire checklist, pilots have the option to eject.

So, there we were: 0415 in the morning, 19,000 feet, flying south over the southern Arabian Gulf, three engines, getting slow because we were 137,000 pounds (our max gross weight is 142,000 pounds), and no remaining fire bottles on the right side, but a pesky fire still burning on the No. 3 engine.

The off-duty FE then piped in with his very calm and reassuring voice, "Yes, sit. It looks like about 18 feet of flame out the tail and 9 feet of Flame from the cowling, just aft of the turbine."

Those of us in the flight station could not see the fire. Clearly, the FE's words were not what we wanted to hear. To me, time stood still while I pondered a long-forgotten flight-school lesson about how a fire could burn through a wing in about 90 seconds. Then, the copilot, who calmly had been flying the plane and working with me and the FE on the checklists, pointed out we were slow.