United States approaches to nonproliferation

DISAM Journal, Wntr, 2003 by John S. Wolf

[The following are excerpts of the speech presented at the meeting of Monterey Nonproliferation Strategy Group, Stockholm, Sweden, September 6, 2002.]

Sweden, through its institutions and its people, has a long history of determined support for non-proliferation. Ambassador Ekeus, in his chairmanship of the U.N. Special Commission is part of this tradition, as are Hans Blix, and of course, Sweden's Ambassador to the United States, Jan Eliasson.

The United States has for over a generation worked to halt the spread of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. For the Bush Administration, this is a fight that is a cardinal objective of U.S. foreign and national security policy. Last September's terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, followed by the anthrax attacks the following month, dramatized the human dimension of these concerns. The heart-rending impact of these terrible acts on the lives of so many ordinary people has brought home what is at stake, for America and the world, if weapons of mass destruction (WMID) are allowed to spread further or if they were to fall into terrorists hands.

March of this year, President Bush stated:

In preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction, there is no margin for error, and no chance to learn from mistakes. Our coalition must act deliberately, but inaction is not an option.

I suppose it is natural at gatherings like this to pierce down into the workings of the various treaties and regimes that so many of you have worked to develop over a period of decades. And my country has long been at the forefront of advocacy for many of these treaties, and in most cases still is. But at the same time, we need to be aware that there are a host of issues call it defiance of the norms and treaties that pose real risks to the international community, and these problems are growing. The facts are indisputable. New weapons programs and their delivery systems in the Middle East, South Asia and East Asia, have real, destabilizing consequences. Regional instabilities generate global ripples political, economic and social.

The ongoing air of confrontation and recurrent crisis in South Asia for example, pose risks well beyond the region. Far from stabilizing the situation or even strengthening individual nation's security, nuclear weapons in South Asia have upped the ante in a way that places millions of ordinary people in far greater danger than ever before. South Asia is but one example of the dangers we must address. Other WMD wannabees have drawn the conclusion that acquisition of WMD weapons will enhance nations security. They are mistaken, and the world is all the more dangerous for their mistake.

Our mission is clear: to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction, missiles, and advanced conventional weapons. The proliferation problem is becoming worse. The number of demandeurs is up, there are more suppliers, due to increasing globalization, and the distinction between buyers and sellers has blurred. Proliferators links to terrorism open up a whole new dimension of concern.

President Bush spoke in his State of the Union address of an "axis of evil". While these words may be harsh, the linkages are real. Iraq, Iran and North Korea, by their continued hostility and their ties to terrorists, pose a direct threat to the United States, its allies and friends, and our deployed forces. North Korea continues to acquire more sophisticated WMD and missile expertise, and is prepared to sell missiles to any country that can buy them. And they have done so. Iran continues its WMD and missile development with help from North Korea, and entities in China and Russia. Iraq covertly diverts or smuggles in technologies that are helping it to reconstitute its WMD and missile capabilities, all in defiance of United Nations Security Council resolutions, and with cynical indifference to the sufferings and deprivations of its own people. And it is now evident that these countries, plus others that have been covertly developing WMD and missiles, and importing technology and components, may now be export ing those same elements to others.

So the stakes are high and the challenges are great. But the news is not all bad. Over the past year, we have some important achievements to be proud of:

We achieved United Nations consensus for a new, more focused and credible export control regime for Iraq, which balances the legitimate humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people first, against firm guidelines to help stop the sale of technologies to be used for military purposes. (But, looking ahead, the real issues of Iraq is just ahead the international community can not continue to tolerate Iraq's continuing defiance of successive United Nations resolutions, its continuing efforts to acquire mass weapons, nor the threat all this poses to Iraq's neighbors, its own people, and each one of us.

* The G-8 has have laid the groundwork to pursue multilateral arrangements to support Russia's program to dispose of 34 tons of surplus weapons-grade plutonium, and we are building a new global partnership that can greatly accelerate work in Russia, the former Soviet Union and beyond to safeguard dangerous materials, destroy chemical weapons stocks, and redirect the work of thousands of former weapons scientist.