The administration's commitment to Sudan

DISAM Journal, Wntr, 2003 by Walter H. Kansteiner, III

[The following are excerpts of the testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on African Affairs, Washington, D.C., July 11, 2002.]

It is indeed an honor to appear again before this Subcommittee, this time to discuss the administration's commitment to bring about a just peace settlement to end the tragic civil war that has raged in Sudan since 1983. I would like to discuss the latest policy developments concerning Sudan, including my recent trip to Khartoum and Nairobi, where I met with the leaders of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement and the Government in Khartoum.

When the administration first laid out its policy towards Sudan, it identified three elements. First, we would deny the use of Sudan by terrorists as a harbor or safe haven. Second, we would ensure humanitarian access to Southern Sudan, and third, support a just and comprehensive settlement of the civil war that has raged there since 1983.

The September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the United States injected a degree of urgency into our counter-terrorism cooperation with Khartoum. The President defined the government's choice in stark terms: you are either with us, or you are against us. The government appears to have calculated that it could not be against us. While I cannot discuss the sensitive details of their cooperation in this unclassified setting, I can with confidence characterize their current cooperation as acceptable, but as the President said, still more is required.

Our Counter-terrorism Coordinator Ambassador Frank Taylor and I just returned from meetings with the senior leadership in Khartoum on July 2, where we discussed our expectations for continued cooperation. We also made it clear to them that a good record of cooperation in counter-terrorism, vital as it might be, does not provide a free ride on other requirements - particularly humanitarian access and a just peace.

Since February 2002, the authorities in Khartoum have aggravated the human tragedy in Sudan more than usual by denying complete humanitarian access to the famine-threatened region of Western Upper Nile. This is in direct contravention of the terms of the Operation Lifeline Sudan agreement they signed with the United Nations and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). We at the Department of State, our colleagues at USAID, and the President's Special Envoy for Peace former Senator John Danforth have repeatedly protested this failure on the part of the Sudanese government to honor its agreement and to safeguard the well-being of its citizens in southern Sudan. I raised the issue directly with President Bashir and Vice-President Taha in Khartoum on July 2. Bashir offered us humanitarian access to eighteen locations in southern Sudan, including four in Western Upper Nile. I made it clear that we would settle for nothing less than what the government has promised to give us: full and unhindered humanitarian ac cess to all of southern Sudan. I delivered a similar message on our deep disappointment that the government's campaign in the South continues to violate the human rights of its citizens by denying them access to needed humanitarian assistance. I want to take this opportunity to reiterate these messages to the government of Sudan.

Prospects are quite positive for the peace process that began June 17 in Nairobi. Lieutenant General Lazaro Sumbeiywo, Kenyan army commander, has provided determined and capable leadership for the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) regional organization hosting the talks. Our diplomatic team in Nairobi is providing day-to-day support for the talks. The British, Norwegians, Swiss and Italians are providing similar assistance. Here in Washington, we have assembled an inter-agency Sudan Programs Group headed by a "Chief Operating Officer" for Sudan policy, Ambassador Michael Ranneberger, to manage the day-to-day work of implementing policies and programs related to the peace process. Presidential Envoy for Peace former Senator John Danforth will travel to Europe next week to consult with our European friends and allies on peace process strategy and will encourage increased financial support for humanitarian and peace process operations. Former Senator Danforth plans another trip to Kenya and Suda n next month to encourage continued forward movement in his meetings with Garang, Bashir and other key figures in the peace process.

General Sumbeiywo's objective is to secure agreement by the parties to a framework by the end of the month, and to achieve a just and comprehensive settlement agreement by the end of the year. These are extremely high goals, but he believes they are eminently doable, and that the parties possess the political will to reach agreement. The United States is fully committed to work with the parties to make General Sumbeiywo's goals a reality.

Until the day that a just and comprehensive peace settlement is reached, the cold reality of the civil war in Sudan is that the two parties will continue a policy of talk and fight. Most recently, the SPLA recaptured Kapoeta, and the government took Gogrial. Of greater concern are the allegations of attacks on civilians by the government of Sudan in contravention of the agreement signed in March 2002 by both sides not to target civilians. The fog of war and the scarcity of on-the-ground reporters who can collect and report the facts have made it difficult to verify these claims. To help establish ground truth capacity, I have sent retired Brigadier General Herb Lloyd to Khartoum to establish and head up a verification unit. It will consist of two groups, each with fixed-wing aircraft: one fifteen-person group in the northern area and a ten-person group in the southern area. The mission of each will be to investigate first-hand any reports of attacks on civilians and report their findings to the U.S. governme nt. We will report verified attacks on civilians as violations of the Geneva Code, to which Khartoum is a signatory. More importantly, and of more immediate importance to the Sudanese overnment, we will interpret any such violations as an indication of bad faith vis-a-vis the peace process that will have a direct, negative impact on prospects for improved bilateral relations.