Force protection from the sea: employing the SPY-1D radar

FA Journal, March-June, 2004 by John A. Robinson

With the threat we face today from mortars and small-caliber rockets throughout southwest and central Asia as well as Africa and the Philippines, we continuously must reassess our force protection posture to minimize risks to our Soldiers, airmen and Marines, wherever possible. The Firefinder countermortar and counterbattery radars are our critical in-house systems to facilitate this effort, but in the event of amphibious operations, there is another, more advanced capability we should consider during our fire support planning process: the AN/SPY-1D(V) radar. This radar is part of the Aegis weapon system on cruisers and destroyers.

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The Radar. The SPY-1D is multifunctional, although it was primarily designed for a littoral environment to address the threat of cruise-type missiles. It is the primary air and surface radar for the Ticonderoga and Arleigh Burke classes of warships.

When getting a Q-36 Firefinder ashore early is not tactically or logistically feasible, the SPY-1D can serve as a more than adequate surrogate. Furthermore, the "V" or variant version of the SPY-1D can pick out targets from amongst land clutter--there are no mask angle issues with the SPY-1D(V). The V-version underwent successful tests in the summer of 2003 and will be fielded aboard the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Pinckney in the summer of 2004.

Configured as four octagonal metal plates bolted to the ship's superstructure, the antenna contains a phased-array system, providing 6400-mil horizontal coverage and azimuth-to-wave-top vertical coverage. It can search for and auto detect targets and transition to track surface and air targets as well as support missile engagement.

While the SPY-1D has been designed primarily to detect theater ballistic missiles (TBMs) at ranges in excess of 500 kilometers, it also can track golf ball-sized targets at ranges in excess of 165 kilometers. It has the ability to track multiple targets simultaneously and help the operator determine the nature of the targets. The land-based threats of mortar, artillery and small-caliber rockets pose no detection problem for the SPY-1D.

Conceptual Employment. With a potential amphibious operation or operation using sea-based assets of naval surface or aerial fire support, the SPY-1D should be considered a first-line or complementary force protection asset. (See Figure 1.) If 5-inch/54-caliber (5"/54) naval guns are planned for fire support, there may be no need for additional naval support requests.

Cruisers have two 5"/54 guns while destroyers have one 5"/54 gun. At least one such vessel is likely to accompany amphibious landing craft or naval rotary- or fixed-wing launching vessels. As always, the first mission of the SPY-1D is to protect the fleet, but contingent upon threat conditions, this mission easily can be modified to include support for amphibious landings.

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The cruiser or destroyer likely will operate from a designated fire support area (FSA), allowing it the freedom of mobility to provide coverage to both fleet and amphibious assets. If the threat condition is so benign that the ship may be allowed to anchor at a single point and provide exclusive support to the landing force, then a fire support station (FSS) may be designated. In consult with the naval gunfire liaison officer (NGLO), the joint task force (JTF) chief of fires designates either an FSA or FSS.

The ship's command and decision system monitors all targets tracked by the SPY-1D radar. Once a target is determined to be a threat, ship missiles or guns may engage a target through the weapons control system, a direct sensor-to-shooter link.

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FM 3-09.30 Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Observed Fire and Fire Support at the Battalion Task Force and Below reminds us that as "direct fire is faster and more accurate, this method is used whenever possible." Ideally, if a ship in support of amphibious or near-shore operations were to detect a hostile ballistic projectile, the fastest and most efficient method of engaging the projectile would be direct fire or "ship adjust."

However, a clearance-of-fires procedure must be conducted with the landing party to protect the force from fratricide. The landing party, possibly controlled by either a unit of action (UA) fire support element (FSE) or higher JTF joint fires element (JFE), has clearance-of-fires responsibility. (See Figure 2.)

A task-organized Navy supporting arms liaison team (SALT) or Marine supporting arms control center (SACC) helps the FSE or JFE. These elements must be manned and equipped to communicate with the supporting vessel; they require high-frequency (HF) radio communications equipment that is not part of an FSE or JFE modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE).

Engagement Options. There may be vaired options available to the landing party to respond to an indirect fire threat. The ship-borne 5"/54 gun(s) is one option, but fire supporters must consider range limitations as these guns do not reach the maximum detection capability of the SPY-1D. (See Figure 3.)